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CLARIFYING THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING
ACT'S EXEMPTION FOR REASONABLE
OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS
Tim Iglesias*
What is crowded to some is exactly what is comfortable
to others; what is comfortable to some is exactly
what is lonely to others.1
My house is open to my relatives. I give them
a helping hand.2
It's a public health and safety issue.3
INTRODUCTION: LIVING CLOSELY AND THE REGULATION
OF "OVERCROWDING"
This article argues that a deceptively simple "exemption" to the
1988 Fair Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) for "reasonable"
governmental occupancy standards has been misinterpreted by nu-
merous courts, particularly by the Sixth Circuit in Affordable
Housing Advocates v. City of Richmond Heights.4 This misinter-
pretation undercuts the protection from housing discrimination
that the FHAA provides for families, especially families of color.
This article sorts through the confusion about the "exemption" and
offers two plausible versions of a "reasonable" standard.
Large families and extended families living closely together in a
single-family house or apartment unit have been a widespread and
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1. Ellen Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards: Inscribing Ethnicity and Family
Relations on the Land, 19 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES. 300, 305 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards].
2. Jonathan Kaufman, Relative Values: Whites and Hispanics Fall Out Over Quest
for Suburban Dream, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at Al (quoting Jose Lara).
3. Id. (quoting William Cogley, corporation counsel of Elgin, IL referring to en-
forcement of housing codes challenged as discrimination).
4. 209 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2000).
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longstanding practice in the United States.5 Choosing to live all
together makes financial sense for many low-income workers and
their families. There is also clear evidence that many households
living closely do so based upon enduring cultural preferences and
non-economic interests.6 In short, living closely produces substan-
5. See KENT W. COLTON, HOUSING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: ACHIEV-
ING COMMON GROUND 27, 35 (2003) (stating that in 1945 there were "2.6 million
doubled-up households (two or more households sharing one housing unit)" and
"[u]nemployment and poor consumer confidence caused more people to live with
family or friends during these economic downturns" (referring to recessions of 1981-
82 and 1990-91) rather than to start new households); C. Theodore Koebel & Mar-
garet S. Murray, Extended Families and Their Housing in the U.S., 14 HOUSING STUD.
125, 134 (1999) (finding that an analysis of the 1989 American Housing Survey
showed that 26.3% of family households included persons outside the household's
nuclear family); Dowell Myers et al., The Changing Problem of Overcrowded Hous-
ing, 62 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 66, 66-67 (1996) [hereinafter Myers, Changing Problem]
("Early in the century, lower-income households were doubled and tripled up in sub-
standard tenement housing.").
6. One researcher's review of the literature found four primary reasons why peo-
ple share housing: (1) emergency situation and need; (2) an opportunity to live in a
better quality home and/or neighborhood; (3) instrumental social support (e.g. mate-
rial and financial assistance, practical advice, assistance with domestic tasks and re-
sponsibilities, and child care) and emotional support (e.g. encouragement and
companionship); and (4) caretaking. Sherry Ahrentzen, Double Indemnity or Double
Delight? The Health Consequences of Shared Housing and 'Doubling Up,' 59 J. Soc.
ISSUES 547, 551-52 (2003); Koebel & Murray, supra note 5, at 72, 126 ("It may be that
[these] households are slow to use the added income to escape from overcrowding,
because they prefer to use their still relatively limited finances for more urgent priori-
ties .... Household extension, often labelled 'doubling up,' is automatically consid-
ered . . . a problem to be solved. However, evidence documenting this problem is
scarce. To others, extension represents a more complex pattern of sharing economic
and emotional resources and is complicated by race, ethnicity and culture."); Myers,
Changing Problem, supra note 5, at 70 ("Among racial and ethnic groups, Hispanic
and Asian households have the highest incidences of overcrowding .... [Ejven the
native-born members of these two ethnic groups have proportionately much higher
levels of overcrowding than do the native-born counterparts among black or white
households."); id. at 72 ("Overcrowding levels are very high for Asians and Hispanics,
not dropping markedly until incomes exceed 80 percent of the median level.... Even
at income levels twice the median, 8 percent of Asian and Hispanic households re-
main overcrowded, which is a percentage well above the national level."); Dowell
Myers & Seong Woo Lee, Immigration Cohorts and Residential Overcrowding in
Southern California, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 51, 64 (1996) (finding that "[m]ajor differences
between race/ethnic groups in reduction of overcrowding appear to be due to differ-
ences in their rate of income growth .... Yet even with income controlled to the
mean across all groups, Hispanics displayed markedly higher incidence of overcrowd-
ing") [hereinafter Myers, Immigration Cohorts]; Ellen Pader, Housing Occupancy
Codes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING (W. Van Vliet ed., 1998) ("Cross-cultural
and historical analyses provide evidence that concepts concerning the preference to
share sleeping and living spaces often relate to deeper core values, such as emphasis
on individualism or communality.") [hereinafter Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes].
A recent group of studies commissioned by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") confirms that housing preferences of minority family
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tial economic, psychological, and social benefits for many
households.7
On the other hand, too many people sharing a dwelling space is
characterized as "overcrowding." Commentators believe that
overcrowding creates significant problems for tenants, such as in-
ability to exit the building safely in an emergency, transmission of
disease, psychological stress, as well as for neighbors such as exces-
sive noise and traffic, and parking congestion.8
households are different from those of other households. JENNIFER JOHNSON & JES-
SICA CIGNA, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., OVERVIEW OF ISSUE PAPERS ON
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IMPORTANT TO HOUSING vi (2003) ("As the number of
households who are married with no children, minority with children, and elderly
households continue to grow proportionately, housing industry participants must ana-
lyze their true preferences rather than rely on past assumptions of housing demand.
For instance, minority households have larger families that sometimes include multi-
ple generations of relations. Assuming that their housing needs are the same as non-
Hispanic white family households would be imprudent."); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 289, 296 n.8 (2002) (referring to preferences for "clustering" even among
higher-income Latinos and Asians).
7. See Ahrentzen, supra note 6, at 548 (calling for further research into the bene-
fits of sharing housing); Myers, Immigration Cohorts, supra note 6, at 64 ("[R]ecent
immigrants may have chosen to save their incomes for purposes they consider more
important, such as remittances to family members in their home country or savings to
start a business."). The capacity of low-income extended families to maintain exten-
sive mutual aid networks is suggested by Annette Lareau in The Long-Lost Cousins
of the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A19 (describing practices of ex-
tended family visits by many working-class and poor families). The benefit to these
households of living closely may redound to society because these living arrangements
make it possible for people to become more productive workers by attending school
and job training, to save money, to become home purchasers, and to use our housing
stock more efficiently.
8. While the term "overcrowding" carries an unambiguously negative connota-
tion, the actual phenomenon is hotly disputed. A substantial study reviewing the pre-
vious scientific literature on the subject reports still disputed linkages between
definitions of "overcrowding" and actual bad consequences. See Myers, Changing
Problem, supra note 5, at 67 ("Implicit in all discussions of crowding is the assump-
tion that it is a policy problem-that the effects from crowding, and especially over-
crowding, are deleterious to people's physical and mental health. Although much
analysis has been marshaled to support this conclusion, it has never been definitively
established. After a century of debate it is still in question whether so-called over-
crowding is harmful to the people affected, or merely socially distasteful to outsiders
who observe its presence among others."). A more recent similar review of the litera-
ture comes to same conclusion. See Ahrentzen, supra note 6, at 549 ("Scientific find-
ings about the relationships between crowding and health have been inconsistent-
some demonstrating links between household density and disease or stress, others
finding no such links. Innumerable research studies suggest that other physical envi-
ronmental factors, . . . personal variables . . . and social conditions ... mediate or
moderate health outcomes in light of household density."). In housing literature and
housing needs reports, "overcrowding" is sometimes considered in the category of
"substandard housing conditions" which primarily concerns physical conditions of
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Since the early 1900's local governments have regulated the
numbers of inhabitants of a dwelling to prevent overcrowding9 by
enforcing residential occupancy standards.'" Residential occu-
pancy standards are maximum limits on "internal density." By set-
ting the minimum space required per occupant, they set the
maximum number of persons who can legally occupy any given
amount of space. There are many types of governmental residen-
tial occupancy standards" and a wide variation in standards. 12
housing units, such as functioning toilets, leaky roofs, and hazardous conditions. See,
e.g., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2003, at 26 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies
of Harvard Univ. ed., 2003) ("Some 9.3 million households live in overcrowded units
or housing classified as physically inadequate.") (hereinafter NATION'S HOUSING]. In
many cases enforcing occupancy restrictions, there are both substandard physical con-
ditions and violations of the local occupancy standard. See, J.K. Dineen, Slumlord
Slapped with Fine, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 12, 2003,1at 1 (describing building "fraught
with code violations" as.well as being overcrowded); Jennifer Mena, In Housing Den-
sity, It's Too Close for Comfort, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at B1 (describing problem
of Santa Ana, California as attracting "poor working families resigned to sharing
houses with strangers and tolerating faulty plumbing and electricity and other defi-
ciencies."). It is unclear if many of the negative consequences for tenants attributed to
"overcrowding" would occur in the absence of physical substandard housing
conditions.
9. See generally Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes, supra note 6. In particular,
the image of New York City tenements teeming with immigrant workers at the time
of the industrial revolution has seared itself into America's collective consciousness.
Under pressure from public health and progressive housing reformers and, initially,
against the wishes of landlords, New York City began regulating internal density in
the late nineteenth century. See Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes, supra note 1. The
1901 New York City Tenement Act became a national model for local governments.
Interestingly, San Francisco, CA, was actually the first city to enact occupancy restric-
tions in its 1870 Lodging House Ordinance, popularly known as the anti-Coolie Act
(Chinese workers were called "coolies."). See id. This ordinance required 500 cubic
feet of air space per person and was "disproportionately enforced in Chinatown
where low-paid, single, working Chinese men shared rooms with less air space each
than mandated." Pader, supra note 6. ,
10. Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes, supra note 1. Occupancy standards gener-
ally regulate how many people can legally occupy a particular space. Id. Most people
are familiar with a broad range of occupancy standards in elevators, motor vehicles,
bathrooms, pools, and restaurants. Residential occupancy standards regulate the
amount of space required for a person to legally dwell in a detached house, a condo-
minium, a cooperative, a mobile home, or an apartment.
11. Most governments control internal density by numerical limits, such as requir-
ing a minimum amount of square feet of floor space for the first occupant and some
additional minimum amount square feet of floor space for each additional occupant.
For example, Madison, WI requires apartments to contain 150 square feet for the first
occupant and at least 100 additional square feet for each additional occupant.
MADISON, WIS., MINIMUM HOUSING AND PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE § 27.06
(2003). Some governments also set "person per bedroom" limitations. See, e.g., 55
PA. CODE § 2620.52 (1991). Pennsylvania requires that bedrooms for more than one
person have at least sixty square feet of space for each person, and provides that no
more than four residents may be housed in a bedroom regardless of its size. Id. Clas-
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sifications can become complex because they require regulations to define "bed-
room," "sleeping area," and "habitable space." For example, in some cities
basements can be used as sleeping areas, and in others not. See, e.g., David W. Chen,
Be It Ever So Low, the Basement Is Often Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
Numerous other housing and planning code provisions affect occupancy and internal
density, including ventilation and lighting requirements. Regulations limiting the
composition of households, such as by definitions of "family" for single family neigh-
borhoods ("family" for single family zone is persons related by blood and a-maximum
of two unrelated persons) limit occupancy. This article primarily considers cases re-
garding facially neutral residential occupancy standards that arguably contravene the
federal fair housing act (as amended) as "familial status" discrimination. It does not
discuss facially discriminatory "familial status" cases (such as a landlord's written "no
children" policy), numerical occupancy standards and definitions of "family" that dis-
criminate against groups of unrelated persons, or occupancy standards maintained in
federally-subsidized housing. For an example of the latter, see DeBolt v. Espy, 47
F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of claim against Farmer's Home Admin-
istration by government-subsidized tenant threatened with eviction for violating pro-
gram-imposed occupancy standard).
12. There is no formal national occupancy standard applying to privately owned,
non-subsidized housing. The International Property Maintenance Code, the ICC's
code which includes its residential occupancy standard, has only been adopted state-
wide, while many states, such as California and Rhode Island, mandate or effectively
mandate residential occupancy standards, allowing local governments to set their own
residential occupancy standards. See Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding that Uniform Housing Code adopted by state preempts local
government occupancy standards unless local government follows specified proce-
dures and makes certain findings); see also IowA CODE § 364.17 (2004) (allowing cit-
ies of 15,000 or more residents to adopt one of several codes, but if the city does not
adopt one, the state considers the city to have adopted one); R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-
24.3-11 (2004) (requiring a minimum of 150 square feet of floor space for the first
occupant, and at least 130 square feet for every additional occupant). For several
decades there has been an effort on the part of building official organizations (Build-
ing Officials and Code Administrators, International Conference of Building Offi-
cials, and Southern Building Code Congress, now united as the International Code
Council ("ICC")) to standardize residential occupancy restrictions. These efforts
have been only partially successful. The International Property Maintenance Code
(ICC's code, which includes its residential occupancy standard) had only been
adopted statewide by five states and the District of Columbia. International Code
Council, International Codes-Adoption by State, available at http://www.iccsafe.org/
government/stateadoptions.xls (last visited May 7, 2004). Governmental residential
occupancy standards can vary considerably. The ICC International Property Mainte-
nance Code provides that the minimum space requirements for three to five occu-
pants are an 120 square feet living room, an 80 square feet dining room, and every
room occupied for sleeping purposes must contain at least 70 square feet for the first
occupant or 50 square feet for each occupant if the bedroom is occupied by more than
one person. Sections 404.4 and 404.5 (2003). The City of Phoenix, AZ requires 250
square feet of floor space for the first two occupants and 150 square feet for every
additional occupant thereafter, calculated on the basis of gross dwelling unit area, not
counting children under thirteen years of age. PHOENIX, Az., CODE § 39-5 (2004).
Randolph Township, NJ requires that for "living space," "[e]very dwelling unit shall
contain at least 600 square feet of habitable floor area for the first two occupants, at
least 100 square feet of additional habitable floor area for each of the next three
occupants, and at least 75 square feet of additional habitable floor area for each addi-
tional occupant." RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP, N.J., CODE § 26-38 (2003). For "sleeping
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The primary policy justification for residential occupancy stan-
dards is protecting public health and safety. 13 Governments re-
quire both private housing providers and residents to abide by
residential occupancy standards. Governments enforce occupancy
standards when issuing occupancy certificates and by code enforce-
ment actions, which are sometimes government-initiated, but are
usually in response to neighbor complaints.14
Much is at stake in the regulation of internal density for govern-
ments, neighbors, and housing providers. In addition to protecting
public health and safety, occupancy standards are one means gov-
ernments use to control density and population in their jurisdic-
tions. 5 Neighbors are generally concerned about "overcrowding"
space" it has essentially the same requirements as the ICC International Property
Maintenance Code, but adds "[n]o room shall be occupied for sleeping purposes by
more than two adults" making an exception for children under three years old. Id.
13. See generally JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS,
LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 309 (2003). But it is
clear from the history of occupancy standards that racism, classicism, paternalism,
moralism (concern for the sexual immorality of others), and pressure to assimilate
immigrants have also played an important role. "The history of occupancy standards
follows the prevailing social, cultural, economic and health rationales of particular
eras and particular sectors of society; they are the product of socially constructed
personal feelings and opinions." Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards, supra note 1,
at 306; see also Ellen J. Pader, Spaces of Hate: Ethnicity, Architecture and Housing
Discrimination, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 881, 885-87 (2002) (providing a history of occu-
pancy standards in the U.S.) [hereinafter Pader, Spaces of Hate]; Ellen J. Pader, Spati-
ality and Social Change: Domestic Space Use in Mexico and the United States, 20 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 114 (1993) (comparing the sociospatial frameworks of Mexicans in sev-
eral locales in the western Mexican state of Jalisco with those of Mexican Americans
and of the dominant U.S. society) [hereinafter Peder, Spaciality and Social Change].
14. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 313.
15. Families need schools for children, larger families will send more children to
schools and make demands on social services, so more families mean more costs.
Governments may be tempted to use residential occupancy standards as a means of
"fiscal zoning." Cities have an economic interest in making zoning decisions (for ex-
ample, preferring the development of one and two bedroom dwellings to larger ones)
that steer families with children away. Occupancy restrictions can be used by govern-
ments to control the "character of the community" as a form of exclusionary zoning
similar to minimum lot size or floor space requirements to exclude unwanted house-
holds. See PETER SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION:.
A LEGAL ANALYSIS & PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 379-80 (2003);
see also United States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *6 (N.D.
I1. June 16, 1997) (adoption in 1991 of more restrictive residential occupancy standard
in response to increased Latino immigration); Briseno, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1378 (find-
ing that state occupancy standard preempts locality's attempt to enact stricter stan-
dard in response to increased Latino residency). For an in-depth analysis of the
history and broader social situation behind the Santa Ana case, see Stacy Harwood &
Dowell Myers, The Dynamics of Immigration and Local Governance in Santa Ana:
Neighborhood Activism, Overcrowding, and Land-Use Policy, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 70
(2002); see also Ben Darvil, Jr., Neighborhood Preservation or Xenophobism?: An
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because of its expected spillover effects: excessive noise and park-
ing and traffic congestion. 16 Private housing providers often claim
their own business reasons for setting and enforcing residential oc-
cupancy standards, such as to avoid higher management costs,
higher insurance costs, and extra maintenance and repair.
17
Internal density regulation is also important to families. Resi-
dential occupancy standards can conflict with a household's desired
level of internal density. For example, a family of five who would
be happy to live in a one or two bedroom dwelling may be required
by occupancy standards to get a dwelling of three or four bed-
rooms.' In many cities the stock of three bedroom apartments
and larger is small.' 9 Often larger detached homes are in old, run-
Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Town of Brookhaven's Rental Occupancy
Law, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 122 (2003) (discussing the
"Neighborhood Preservation Act" adopted by town in response to "overcrowding"
under conditions of intense anti-Latino sentiment).
16. It has been suggested, however, that some neighbor resistance to high levels of
internal density proceeds from preferences about how others should live. See gener-
ally Myers, Changing Problem, supra note 5.
17. As an indication of the importance of this issue, the National Multi Housing
Council and the National Apartment Association (the two largest lobbies for apart-
ment owners and investors) lists "Preserving an owners' two-person-per-bedroom oc-
cupancy standard as presumptively reasonable under the Fair Housing Act" as one of
its "critical issues" for 2003. National Multi Housing Council's website is available at
http://www.nmhc.org (last visited August 23, 2004) (source on file with author).
"Housing providers know that overcrowding, excessive noise, and deterioration of
properties often occur when more than two persons reside in a bedroom." Nat'l Multi
Hous. Council, 2003 Legislative and Regulatory Priorities: Property and Asset Man-
agement (on file with the author). These costs, however, have rarely been docu-
mented in court. See Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act: Discrimination Against Families With Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 297, 319-27 (1995) (finding, inter alia, no evidence of higher insurance rates among
apartments renting to children, but noting landlord's ability to charge more for child-
free units). But see Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 703 (Ct.
App. 1971).
18. In Bedford Heights, OH, they would probably have to rent a three bedroom
dwelling. The 1991 amendments to the Bedford Heights ordinance required 200
square feet of habitable space for the first person and 150 square feet of habitable
space for each additional person. BEDFORD HEIGHTS, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCE
§ 1387.14. Due to the composition of the housing stock in Bedford Heights, the effect
of this ordinance would be that more than 80% of two bedroom apartments in major
apartment complexes would be limited to three persons. Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n.
v. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. 825, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
19. Nationally, based upon U.S. Census Bureau data, the National Association of
Home Builders calculated that between 1985 and 2002, 80% or more of all apart-
ments are two bedrooms or less (between 50% - 60% two bedrooms, and the rest one
bedroom and studios); only between 10% and 21% [sic] of all apartments are three
bedrooms or larger. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, Characteristics of Units Com-
pleted in Multifamily Buildings (1985-2002), available at http://www.nahb.org/generic.
aspx?genericContentlD=375 (last visited May 7, 2004).
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down urban areas.20 Residential occupancy standards may severely
restrict families' housing choices in many cities and suburbs.
Latino and Asian families are disproportionately and adversely
affected by residential occupancy standards because they tend to
have larger households (because of more children and extended
families) as well as stronger preferences for living closely.21 Occu-
pancy restrictions limit the housing opportunities for these fami-
lies22 and increase racial and economic residential segregation by
restricting which jurisdictions and neighborhoods where they may
live.2 3 They also force many families to purchase more space than.
they feel they need.24 Even apparently small changes in occupancy
20. See generally Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes, supra note 6.
21. See Myers, Changing Problem, supra note 5, at 72, 81. Demographically, resi-
dential occupancy standards will impact these groups more than other groups. Family
households are on average larger than non-family households. Even though house-
holds with children are a small percentage of total households in the U.S., they consti-
tute 70% of all households with four or more persons. Jim Morales, Resolving the
Debate Over Occupancy Standards, YOUTH L. NEWS (FHF Project, New York, N.Y.)
Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 11. There are statistical overlaps between families, especially
larger families, and race/ethnicity. People of color are more likely to have children
than other households. They are more likely to have more children in their house-
holds than the average family. And they are more likely to have extended families
living together which also tends to increase relative household size. According to the
1990 census, in California, Latino households constitute 17.7% of all households, but
43.6% of households with five or more persons. Id.
22. For example, the two person per bedroom standard championed by private
housing providers means that a couple with a baby must rent at least a two bedroom
house or apartment. Restrictive residential occupancy standards also combine with
other zoning and land use decisions to restrict housing opportunities. And cities have
fiscal incentives to limit the development of dwellings with more units. See SALSICH,
JR. & TRYNIECKI, supra note 15, at 380.
23. In many cities, the only larger houses or apartments are older ones which are
often located in less desirable neighborhoods with inferior schools and less access to
services, jobs, and transportation.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Ap-
pellees admitted that occupancy of the two-bedroom and three-bedroom apartments
is restricted to two persons. As a result of this policy, no family which consisted of
two parents and a child, or a single parent and two children, could rent any apartment
at Georgetown [apartment complex]."). Most apartment bedrooms range in size from
100 square feet (10' x 10') to 120 square feet (10' x 12'). A common residential occu-
pancy standard provides: "Every bedroom occupied by one person shall contain at
least seventy square feet of floor area, and every bedroom occupied by more than one
person shall contain at least fifty square feet of floor area for each occupant thereof."
International Code Council's International Property Maintenance Code § 404.41
(2003) [metric equivalents omitted]. Madison, Wisconsin's housing code provides that
the floor area of a lodging room shall provide not less than eighty square feet of floor
area for one occupant and sixty square feet for each additional occupant. MADISON,
WIS., MINIMUM HOUSING AND PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE § 27.06 (2003). A
"Lodging Room" is defined in section 27.03 as "a portion of a dwelling used primarily
for sleeping and living purposes, excluding cooking facilities." Id. § 27.03. The ICC
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standards can have significant effects on the housing available to
families.
When Congress included "familial status" as a newly protected
class for the first time in the 1988 federal Fair Housing Acts
Amendments (FHAA), it recognized that families regularly suf-
fered from housing discrimination.26 The FHAA provides families
whose housing opportunities were negatively impacted by residen-
tial occupancy standards a potential claim for housing discrimina-
tion against both governments and private housing providers.27
The same amendments also included an exemption for "reasona-
ble" governmental occupancy restrictions.28 Affordable Housing
standard will allow two persons per bedroom in a bedroom of typical size because it
requires 100 square feet for two persons, but the Madison Code would technically
restrict bedrooms of typical size to one person since it would require 140 square feet
for two persons (80 + 60 = 140).
25. Occupancy standards can also have incidental effects on housing opportuni-
ties. Eligibility for federal relocation benefits can turn on whether occupancy is lawful
or not. See Haddock v. Dept' of Cmty. Dev., 526 A.2d 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987) (reversing lower court's denial of relocation benefits for tenants who were una-
ware of violating code, so that the violation was not primarily caused by their conduct
and whose tenancy was therefore "lawful'); Leslie Kaufman, A Catch-22 For Parents
Trying to Do Better, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at BI (explaining how the inability of a
mother to afford an apartment the size required by state housing occupancy standards
prevents her from reuniting with her children).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2004).
27. Id. Plaintiffs could bring cases grounded in both disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact theories.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2004). This one sentence exemption and the related
enforcement of occupancy standard violations has been the subject of an extraordi-
nary amount of conflict. The exemption provoked significant comments in response
to HUD's proposed regulations. "A number of commenters indicated that the pro-
posed rule did not adequately address the question of what occupancy standards, if
any, can be used by persons in connection with the sale and rental of dwellings."
Implementation of the Fair Housing Standards of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan.
23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.100) [hereinafter HUD Preamble]. HUD's
attempts to clarify the liability of private housing providers for discriminatory occu-
pancy standards included three internal guidance memoranda by HUD Generals
Counsel, two of which were hastily withdrawn after uproars they caused among hous-
ing interest groups. See Nat'l Multi Hous. Council, Occupancy Standards: Regulatory
and Legislative History (Dec. 1, 1997) (on file with author); HOUSING DISCRIMINA-
TION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 9:6 (Robert G. Schwemm ed. 2003). In 1995, 1996,
1998, and 1999, Congress considered several bills regarding occupancy standards.
These are the United States Housing Act of 1995, H.R. 2406, 104th Cong. (1995);
State Occupancy Standards Affirmation Act of 1996, H.R. 3385, 104th Cong.(1995);
State Occupancy Standards Affirmation Act of 1999, H.R. 176, 106th Cong. (1999).
Two bills were passed concerning the issue: The Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, passed by Congress in 1996 included a provision prohibiting HUD from
using any funds to take any enforcement action with respect to fair housing allega-
tions against a private housing provider's occupancy standard unless the standard con-
travened the so-called "Keating Memorandum," issued by HUD General Counsel
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Advocates v. City of Richmond Heights,29 decided by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in 2000, construed the exemption to give considerable leeway
to governments. 3° Additionally, some courts appear ready to ex-
tend the exemption for reasonable governmental occupancy stan-
dards to private housing providers if private residential occupancy
standards are consistent with governmental restrictions, in effect
using the governmental exemption to provide a "safe harbor" for
private housing providers.31 In a time when the proportion of
housing needed for families of color is expected to grow 32 and our
Frank Keating on March 20, 1991. See HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGA-
TION, supra note 28, § 9:6. In 1998, Congress mandated that HUD adopt the Keating
Memorandum as an official policy and publish a Notice of statement of policy to this
effect in the Federal Register. See 63 Fed. Reg. 70256 (1998) (HUD Notice of State-
ment of Policy implementing the requirements of § 589 of the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461). This legisla-
tion also specifically amended HUD's regulatory authority: "The Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development shall not directly or indirectly establish a national
occupancy standard." Id. In 1995, Professor Edward Allen described the exemption
as "the most contentious FHAA issue which affects newly protected categories." Al-
len, supra note 17, at 319. He concluded:
Despite criticism of recent HUD decisions, no court or commentator has
managed to propose a practical solution or lend tangible guidance which
satisfies all parties as to what is "reasonable." The dearth of large units com-
bined with the abundance of large families will likely continue and present
both political and legal issues for the foreseeable future. This is especially
true given the cultural diversity of many residents, some of whom may well
have lived voluntarily in extremely crowded conditions, others of whom may
have no viable options because of their modest incomes.
Id. at 326. In the 2001 update of his nationally-recognized treatise on fair housing
law, Professor Schwemm noted: "The question of what constitutes 'reasonable' occu-
pancy standards has continued to cause problems throughout the 1990s." HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 9:6.
29. 209 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2000).
30. The Sixth Circuit held that governments bear the burden of proof to demon-
strate that their occupancy restrictions are reasonable but otherwise deferred to the
governments setting of an occupancy standard as a "legislative act." See infra discus-
sion Part II.A.3.
31. See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2000); CHRO v.
J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374, at *10-15 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 20, 2001).
32. "Last summer, the Census Bureau announced that Latinos had surpassed
blacks as the country's largest minority, with blacks making up 13.1 percent of the
population in 2002, and Hispanics 13.4 percent." Mireya Navarro, Blacks and Latinos
Try to Find Balance in Touchy New Math, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at Al. "Because
of both differences in fertility and immigration, a greater number of younger, more
family-structured households will be minority households.... A large part of future
minority growth is among Hispanic households currently in residence." JOHNSON &
CIGNA, supra note 6, at v-vi. Immigration by both Hispanics and Asians is likely to
continue. Six states are most likely destinations for Hispanic immigrants: California,
Texas, New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Illinois. Id. at vii.
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national housing crisis continues unabated,33 City of Richmond
Heights' broad definition of "reasonable" together with a "safe
harbor" defense threaten to undercut these families' fair housing
rights. 34
Part I recounts the adoption of the FHAA's familial status provi-
sion and the "reasonable" standard exemption.3 5 In Part II, ana-
lyzes relevant case law and the legislative history to demonstrate
that "reasonable" must mean "non-discriminatory." I argue that
the City of Richmond Heights "reasonable" standard is wrong be-
cause it fails to incorporate this needed non-discrimination ele-
ment. I suggest that a better alternative "reasonable" standard can
be derived from Elliott v. City of Athens,36 a 1992 Eleventh Circuit
decision. In the process of deriving an alternative "reasonable"
standard, the article confronts the conundrum caused by Congress'
language in the "exemption" and its legislative history which has
heretofore been ignored by the courts. Part IV offers a potential
justification of the safe harbor extension and clarifies how courts
should apply it. The article concludes that if courts apply the safe
harbor defense, they should require private housing provider de-
fendants to demonstrate that the governmental occupancy restric-
tions upon which they rely qualify for the exemption. Courts
33. See, e.g., NATION'S HoUSING, supra note 8.
34. Most enforcement of residential occupancy standards is done by private hous-
ing providers when tenants apply for apartments. Most FHAA challenges of residen-
tial occupancy standards are against private housing providers. See, e.g., Pfaff v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Badgett,
976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992); Reeves, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 720; United States v. Lepore,
816 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.N.Y.
1995); CHRO, 2001 WL 951374; Human Rights Comm'n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 659
(Vt. 1995). Private housing provider defendants regularly raise the safe harbor de-
fense. If accepted by courts, this exemption would potentially reach all private hous-
ing in every city. So, government-adopted standards could become the baseline for
what is discriminatory under the FHAA. This means that this exemption could be-
come a huge loophole for restrictive occupancy standards to become exempt from the
FHAA.
35. Most law review literature on "overcrowding" concerns the important and se-
rious problem of overcrowding in prisons, ironically the one situation in which the
government has an affirmative duty to provide housing. There has been little atten-
tion to the regulation of internal density in law reviews. See Allen, supra note 17;
Harry Kelly, Discrimination and Occupancy Limits: Finding a Middle Ground, 4 J.
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 51 (1995); Jim Morales, The Emergence of
Fair Housing Protections Against Arbitrary Occupancy Standards, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 103
(1996). Also see national occupancy standard expert Ellen Pader's articles cited
herein. An article entitled "A Clarification of the Maximum Occupancy Restriction
of the FHA," by Clover S. Pitts, 17 Miss. C. L. REV. 381 (1997), merely reviews the
City of Edmonds case decided in 1995. A recent exception is Dravil, supra note 14.
36. 960 F.2 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
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should reject the City of Richmond Heights "reasonable" standard
and adopt one that comports with the exemption's language, Con-
gress' legislative intent, and the FHAA's remedial purposes.
I. THE EXEMPTION AND THE SAFE HARBOR EXTENSION OF
THE EXEMPTION
A. The FHAA "Familial Status" Provision
In 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA")
prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin.37 The stated policy of the FHA is "to pro-
vide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States. '38 Twenty years later, in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), Congress prohibited hous-
ing discrimination on the basis of "familial status. '39 The addition
of familial status to protected classes followed extensive documen-
tation of discrimination against families and the effects of such dis-
crimination.40 Congress' primary goal in enacting the familial
status provision was to protect families from housing discrimina-
tion.4 It also sought to address the use of familial discrimination
as a subtle form of racial discrimination.42 In particular, landlords
accused of racial discrimination would often contend that their re-
fusal to rent was based upon the presence of children in the house-
hold rather than the race of the proposed occupants.43 There was
37. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(1968).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2004).
39. Familial status is defined in the FHAA as "one or more individuals (who have
not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with . . . a parent or other person
having legal custody of such individual or individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k), Pub. L.
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (2004).
40. For example, a 1980 national study "found that 25% of the 79,000 rental units
surveyed banned families with children entirely and another 50% imposed at least
some restrictions." HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28,
§ 11E-3 (citations omitted).
41. "The basic purpose of the familial status provisions was said to be to protect
families with children from discrimination in housing, without unfairly limiting hous-
ing choices for elderly persons." HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION,
supra note 27, § 11E-6.
42. "Another purpose was to eliminate a form of discrimination that has a dis-
criminatory effect on black and Hispanic households and that 'is often used as a
smokescreen to exclude minorities from housing."' Id. §§ 11E-6, E-7.
43. "Congress was also concerned that discrimination against children often
camouflages racism or has an undesirable impact on minorities." Soules v. U.S. Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 711,
100th Cong). See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on familial status and racial dis-
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also, at least among some legislators, a concern about families'
ability to afford housing.44 Although the legislative history behind
the provisions adding familial status as a protected category is not
extensive,45 the Supreme Court has recognized the FHA's "broad
and inclusive" compass as a remedial statute.46
The FHAA prohibits housing discrimination in housing produc-
tion, sale, and finance as well as in landlord-tenant relations and
zoning for its protected classes.47 Congress recognized restrictive
residential occupancy standards applied by governments and by
private housing providers as one significant form of discrimina-
tion.48
Restrictive residential occupancy standards may subject govern-
ments or private housing providers to liability under the FHAA's
familial status provision in several ways.49 If governments or pri-
vate housing providers enforce residential occupancy standards
that treat families differently from non-family households, they
may be liable under a disparate treatment theory. 50 A residential
crimination claims where landlord's rental agent refuses to rent a two bedroom apart-
ment to an African American family of four citing occupancy standard limiting
maximum of three persons in a two bedroom apartment, but later tells a white tester
to falsify his rental application to get around the occupancy restriction); HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 11E-2 (citing additional leg-
islative history and pre-1988 cases).
44. See United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (citing
statement of Rep. Miller).
45. Aside from some references in floor debates, there is only one legislative re-
port, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Report 100-711:
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 100th Cong., reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173.
46. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 731(1995) (citing Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972)).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-3608, 3617, 3631 (2004).
48. Pre-1988 cases in which landlords defended their refusals to rent based upon
children or too many children include Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) and Bush v. Kaim, 297 F.Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969). Courts applying the
statute have also recognized the discriminatory potential of restrictive occupancy
standards. For example, in United States v. Tropic Seas, the court stated, "Clearly,
Tropic Seas' occupancy provision has a direct 'discriminatory effect' on the Sallees;
the provision impacts on them based on their familial status by restricting their choice
of housing." 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (D. Haw. 1995). Plaintiff's statistical expert
indicated that "Tropic Seas' occupancy provision regarding studio and one-bedroom
apartments would exclude 92 to 95% of all families withchildren, but only 19 to 21%
of all families without children." Id.
49. This article focuses on concerns about claims of discrimination under "familial
status." Plaintiffs alleging that occupancy standards discriminate on the basis of race,
color, national origin, or handicap can also bring a suit under the FHAA.
50. Numerous types of disparate impact claims have been brought against land-
lords. Variations of this type of claim include if a landlord will accept three adults but
1224 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
occupancy standard that does not mention family status is not im-
mune from a charge that discriminates on the basis of family sta-
tus.51 If governments or private housing providers enforce
residential occupancy standards that disproportionately burden
families, they may be liable under a disparate impact theory.52
B. The Exemption for "Reasonable" Governmental
Occupancy Standards
During Congressional consideration of the bill that would be-
come the FHAA, both governments and private housing providers
were concerned that the "familial status" provision would create
significant new liability for their traditional regulation of internal
density and change the relationship between governmental and pri-
vate regulation of internal density.53 Before the FHAA, with few
exceptions, governments could regulate internal density under the
police power subject only to deferential "rational basis" review if
an ordinance was challenged as offending due process or equal
not a mother and her two children, if a landlord accepts a household of three unre-
lated persons but not a family of four persons for a two-bedroom apartment, or if a
landlord would rent to two parents and two children but not to single mother and
three children. For an example of the latter, see Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720,
728 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The U.S. Department of Justice has successfully prosecuted
claims of discriminatory treatment against several local governments, including three
cities in Illinois (Cicero, City of Elgin, and Waukegan). See Pader, Spaces of Hate,
supra note 13, at 889-91 (describing the Illinois cases). In Wildwood, N.J., the Depart-
ment of Justice found that enforcement of a new occupancy ordinance was targeted
only at potential Latino home buyers. Ellen Pader, Restricting Occupancy, Hurting
Families, Planners Network, available at http://www.plannersnetwork.org/htm/pub/
archives/134/pader.htm (last visited August 24, 2004).
51. For example, courts might find a violation of the FHAA where there is evi-
dence that a neutral occupancy rule was put in place in order to discriminate based
upon familial status to favor households without children. See, e.g., United States v.
Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Human Rights Comm'n v. LaBrie, Inc.,
668 A.2d 659 (Vt. 1995).
52. By 1988, the applicability of disparate impact theory of discrimination was well
established in fair housing law. See NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d
Cir. 1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th
Cir. 1977) (recognizing impact theory in FHAA and setting out four part test). The
fact that disparate impact theory could be used to prove liability for familial status
based upon a facially neutral residential occupancy standard was confirmed in 1992 by
the first federal appellate decision applying the exemption to an occupancy restric-
tion. See United States v. Badgett. 976 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1992) (remanding
case because the district court erred in failing to apply disparate impact test). While
occupancy cases can and have been brought on a disparate treatment theory of dis-
crimination, this article is directed only to disparate impact cases.
53. See infra Part III.
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protection. 4 Private housing providers were merely subject to
(usually local) government occupancy standards: they could not
"overcrowd" their properties, but they were free to restrict occu-
pancy more than governmental standards required.
Governments and private housing providers realized that the ad-
dition of "familial status" would change this traditional regulatory
structure. Congress was not proposing to completely preempt state
and local government regulation of internal density, but to restrict
it by introducing a novel anti-discriminatory limitation to govern-
mental regulation of internal density. With the new legislation it
would became possible that a government's occupancy restrictions
could be a constitutionally valid exercise of police power but still
might violate the FHAA as discriminatory. In addition, private
housing providers would now become subject to another layer of
regulation-both to state and local laws regulating overcrowding
and to the FHAA for possible discrimination for their restrictions
on occupancy. 56 Many private housing providers had limited occu-
54. Professor Schwemm surveys the limited protection against discrimination fam-
ilies received prior to 1988. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra
note 28, § 11E:1-5. He concludes, "In short, not a single jurisdiction had a law whose
coverage and remedies were as broad as those envisioned by the 1988 Amendments
Act, which called for banning familial status discrimination in every one of Title VII's
substantive provisions (excepting only housing for older persons) and which provided
the same enforcement procedures and remedies for familial status discrimination as
were made available to victims of more traditional forms of discrimination." For an-
other discussion of pre-1988 anti-discrimination law, see Allen, supra note 17, at 305-
07.
55. In fact, some elected officials feared that a broad interpretation of the FHAA
could ruin single family neighborhoods by completely overriding local zoning author-
ity. In the first case regarding the exemption to reach the Supreme Court, City of
Edmonds v. Washington State Building Code Council, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court's decision which found a local jurisdiction's definition of "family" ex-
empt from the FHAA. 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994). "The basic building block for the
exercise of zoning powers by a local jurisdictions [sic] is the creation of a zone in each
community set aside for the residential use of single families." Petition for Cert., No.
94-23 1994 WL 16011973 at *18 (June 13, 1994). "The Ninth Circuit's decision in this
case would remove the basic zoning block of single family residential zoning and place
the federal courts [in the place of zoning boards]. Nothing in the legislative history
indicates Congress' intent to overturn single family zoning." Id. at *22-23.
56. After the enactment of the FHAA, there were three possible relationships
between local government occupancy standards and private housing provider occu-
pancy standards vis-A-vis FHAA and local code enforcement liability. First, if a pri-
vate housing provider's policy is less restrictive than applicable local governmental
occupancy standard (i.e. would allow more people to occupy room that applicable
governmental restriction allows-allow "overcrowding" by governmental definition),
it would be subject to a code enforcement action. And, if the applicable local govern-
mental standard was particularly restrictive, it could also be violating the FHAA.
Second, if a private housing provider's policy is the same as the applicable local gov-
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pancy to adults or placed restrictions on families with children for
decades prior to 1988."7 These new provisions raised concerns
about their liability. They seemed caught in a bind: if they ac-
cepted families in apartments that private housing providers
thought inappropriate for families, they might be liable in tort; if
they did not accept families, they might be liable for discrimination
based upon familial status under the FHAA.58
In these ways, the possibility of familial status discrimination lia-
bility created uncertainty among both governments and private
housing providers about the legality of their traditional efforts to
regulate internal density.
Congress recognized these concerns by including a specific ex-
emption in the FHAA which limits liability for discrimination
claims based upon occupancy restrictions.59 The exemption pro-
vided: "Nothing in this title limits the applicability of any reasona-
ble local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum
ernmental occupancy standard, it would be in compliance with it, but they might still
violate the FHAA if the local governmental occupancy standard violates the FHAA.
Third, if private housing provider's policy is more restrictive than the applicable local
governmental occupancy standard, it would not violate it, but might still violate the
FHAA.
57. See supra note 40.
58. See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 656 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (questioning whether
under the proposed FHAA a landlord must allow a family with ten children to live in
a two-bedroom apartment). Housing providers feared they would have to accommo-
date families even to the extent of violating governmental occupancy codes. Hous-
ING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 9:6. Housing providers
also expressed their concerns to HUD during the notice and comment period while it
drafted regulations to implement the FHAA. See HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,
3236 (Jan. 23. 1989). Landlords and investors in apartments feared that FHAA famil-
ial status provisions would force them to accept tenants that their premises are not
appropriate for thus exposing them to tort liability, force them to accept more tenants
than they feel they can "manage," and force them to deplete their property at a faster
rate than they prefer. See, e.g., United States v. Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1354
(D. Haw. 1995) (defendant sent letter to HUD Secretary Jack Kemp regarding fear of
exposure to tort liability if forced to allow children, and sought an exemption for
apartments to exclude children). A report commissioned by concerned interest
groups warned that enforcement of FHAA law against occupancy standards would
have the unintended consequence of reducing the supply and quality of affordable
housing. WILLIAM C. BAER, RENTAL CROWDING AND OCCUPANCY STANDARDS: A
LITERATURE REVIEW AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1995); see also Allen, supra note 17, at
301-04 (discussing private housing providers' opposition to familial status provisions).
59. In addition to this exemption, the FHAA recognized several other explicit ex-
emptions from its provisions: certain dwellings, certain religious organizations and
private clubs, and certain housing for older people were exempted. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3603(b), 3607 (2004).
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number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."6 ° In Janu-
ary 1989, HUD promulgated its final regulations on the FHAA.
The one sentence regulation regarding occupancy standards merely
quoted the exemption's statutory language. 61 HUD also included
an extensive "Preamble" intended as "analytical guidance" to its
final regulations on the FHAA.62 Regarding the exemption, the
Preamble only repeated language from the House Report that pro-
vided: "That provision is intended to allow reasonable governmen-
tal limitations on occupancy to continue as long as they are applied
to all occupants, and do not operate to discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national ori-
gin."'63 HUD has provided no guidance as to what constitutes a
"reasonable" governmental occupancy restriction for purposes of
the exemption.64
60. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2004).
61. 24 C.F.R. § 100.10(a)(3) (2004). The same sentence is repeated at 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.301(b) under Subpart E: Housing for Older Persons.
62. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232. The Preamble was published as an appendix to the final
regulations in the Federal Register for the public's convenience in response to the
request of a commenter "to assure its availability to the public." Id. at 3280.
63. Id. at 3237 (citing H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong. (1988)). "Many jurisdic-
tions limit the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of square
feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of the unit; HUD also issues occupancy guide-
lines in its assisted housing programs. Reasonable limitations do not violate the Fair
Housing Act as long as they apply equally to all occupants." Id. at 3253 (citing 24
C.F.R. § 100.301 (2004)). There is also a reference to the exemption in the section of
HUD's regulations relating to HUD's certification of substantially equivalent agen-
cies in 24 C.F.R. § 115.202(c) (2004): "The requirement that the state or local law
prohibit discrimination on the basis of familial status does not require that the state or
local law limit the applicability of any reasonable local, state or Federal restrictions
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."
64. HUD has never issued any formal regulations on what constitutes "reasona-
ble" governmental occupancy standards. On July 12, 1995, Nelson Diaz, HUD's Gen-
eral Counsel, issued an "Internal Memorandum," in force for about three months,
which stated that governmental restrictions which were more restrictive than the stan-
dard articulated in that Memorandum would be subject to further evaluation to deter-
mine if they were "reasonable." Memorandum from Nelson A. Diaz, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, to All Field Assistant General
Counsel (July 12, 1995) (on file with the author) (regarding occupancy standards
under the Fair Housing Act). A subsequent memo, issued by Elizabeth K. Julian,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Initiatives, officially withdrew the
Diaz Memorandum. Memorandum from Elizabeth K. Julian, Acting Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Policy and Initiatives, to Fair Housing Enforcement Directors, In-
vestigative Division Directors, FHAP, and FHIP Divisions (Sept. 25, 1995) (on file
with the author) (regarding occupancy cases). In litigation against the Town of Cic-
ero, Ill., the Department of Justice took the position that an occupancy code would be
"reasonable" "if the ordinance allows at least as many persons as would be allowed
under section PM-405 of the 1996 Building Officials & Code Administrators Interna-
tional, Inc. National Property Maintenance Code (with additional qualifications)."
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II. CLARIFYING THE FHAA "EXEMPTION"
Since 1989, the law of familial discrimination as applied to occu-
pancy standards and the exemption has become quite muddled.
There is no dispute that the exemption applies to reasonable gov-
ernmental standards. The statutory language, 65 the legislative his-
tory,66 HUD's comments 67 and case law, 68 all agree on this point.69
There has not been a clear understanding, however, of what consti-
United States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June
16, 1997). This position was taken during the time the Diaz Memorandum was in
force. Federal agency internal memoranda and litigation positions, however, are not
typically accorded deference by courts.
65. The statutory language appears plain; it specifically refers to "local, State and
Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to oc-
cupy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2004). In this frequently used phrase, "lo-
cal" refers to units of government subordinate to States, such as municipalities, cities,
townships, and counties.
66. These provisions are not intended to limit the applicability of any reason-
able local, State, or Federal restrictions on the maximum number of occu-
pants permitted to occupy a dwelling unit. A number of jurisdictions limit
the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of square
feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of the unit. Reasonable limitations by
governments would be allowed to continue, as long as they were applied to
all occupants, and did not operate to discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, handicap or familial status.
H.R. REP. No. 711, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2192.
67. HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989). "Many jurisdictions limit
the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of square feet in the
unit or the sleeping areas of the unit." Id.
68. Several decisions have applied the language to governmental restrictions chal-
lenged as violating the FHAA. See United States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805,
1997 WL 337379, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1997) (denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, inter alia, because of lack of evidence that its ordinance was "reason-
able" and thus qualifying for exemption). The exemption was also challenged as
"void for vagueness" by a private housing defendant in a 1995 district court case.
United States v. Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1362 (D. Haw. 1995). The court re-
sponded: "The Act is clear on its face that it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of
familial status. Similarly, § 3607(b)(1) is clear on its face regarding its application to
government ordinances or rules." Id. at 1362; see also Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v.
City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (clarifying burdens of proof
and "reasonable" standard of exemption for government defendants' occupancy re-
strictions); Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that zoning
ordinance definition of family was eligible for the exemption), overruled by City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
69. Part III, infra, discusses whether courts should extend this exemption for rea-
sonable governmental standards to provide a "safe harbor" defense for private hous-
ing providers whose occupancy standards are consistent with governmental occupancy
restrictions.
OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS
tutes a "reasonable" governmental restriction which qualifies for
the exemption. v
This section reviews the three principal cases that shed light on
the meaning of "reasonable."' City of Edmonds is the only Su-
preme Court case to consider the exemption.71 City of Edmonds
Court, however, did not define "reasonable." Instead, it identified
three requirements for eligibility for the exemption.72 Other courts
have provided three distinct interpretations of the "reasonable"
standard.73 The district court in City of Richmond Heights equated
"reasonable" with the traditional "rational basis" test.74 The Sixth
Circuit City of Richmond Heights court reversed the lower court; it
articulated a standard in which the government bears the burden of
proof but otherwise adopted the traditional "rational basis" test.75
Finally, the court in Elliot v. City of Athens interpreted "reasona-
ble" to require balancing the governmental objective against the
amount of discrimination caused by the occupancy standard.76
What follows is a complex argument. For this reason, I offer the
following summary of my reasoning. In creating the "reasonable"
standard Congress appears to be requiring that, in order to be ex-
empt from FHAA liability, governmental occupancy restrictions
must meet some level of scrutiny that is in between being merely
constitutionally valid (which would effectively read "reasonable"
out of the statute), on the one hand, and being in full compliance
with the FHAA's normal standard of non-discrimination on the
other (which would effectively read the exemption itself out of the
statute because it would be a nullity). Recognizing the inherent
ambiguity of the term "reasonable," I rely on legislative history to
argue that "reasonable" must mean non-discriminatory.77 But the
challenge is not simply to find an intermediate non-discriminatory
70. Professor Schwemm identifies the meaning of "reasonable" as an unresolved
issue. HOUsING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 9:6.
71. 514 U.S. 725.
72. See id.; infra Part II.A.1.
73. Many of the cases brought against governmental entities were brought by
HUD or the Department of Justice and were settled before trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *3 (N.D. 111. June 16,
1997) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, inter alia, because of lack
of evidence that its ordinance was "reasonable," but not defining "reasonable").
74. I reject this version as reading "reasonable" out of the statute. See infra Part
II.
75. Id. I reject this version of the standard as failing to incorporate a necessary
non-discriminatory dimension.
76. Id. The City of Athen's interpretation has been ignored since its primary hold-
ing was overruled by the Edmonds Court.
77. See infra Part II.
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standard, because Congress' specific language in the legislative his-
tory "not operate to discriminate" requires that "reasonable" mean
non-discriminatory as understood in a disparate impact theory. I
then argue that it is impossible to identify. two different disparate
impact standards (the "duplication problem"), one to apply to de-
termine if an ordinance qualifies for the "exemption," and another
to apply if it does not qualify. . To save the exemption from being
a nullity, I argue that it should be interpreted to be the sole defense
for governments' occupancy standards from FHAA liability.79 I
then derive two plausible versions of a "reasonable" standard
based upon the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in City of Athens:8  a
"reasonable balance" standard and a "reasonable means-ends fit"
standard.81
A. City of Edmonds, the City of Richmond Heights Cases,
and City of Athens
1. City of Edmonds
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the exemption
only once: in the 1995 case City of Edmonds v. Oxford House,
Inc."2 The Court gave some important guidance regarding the ap-
78. See infra Part II.C.
79. See infra Part II.D.
80. Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 983 (11th Cir. 1992).
81. See infra Part II.D.
82. 514 U.S. 725 (1995). The majority's 6-3 opinion, authored by Justice Ginsberg,
was expressed in a "bright line" fashion treating the issue as primarily one of defini-
tion. This is a common way that many statutory exemptions work. Justice Thomas
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the scope of exemption. Id. at 738. In
a vigorous dissent, he took the majority to task for its supposed "plain reading" of the
statutory text and its importation of planning concepts that Congress may not have
been aware of. Id. at 738-48.
Section 3607(b)(1) limits neither the permissible purposes of a qualifying
zoning restriction nor the ways in which such a restriction may accomplish its
purposes. Rather, the exemption encompasses "any" zoning restriction-
whatever its purpose and by whatever means it accomplishes that purpose-
so long as the restriction "regard[s]" the maximum number of occupants.
Id. at 747.
Justice Thomas also wrote:
ITihe category of zoning rules the majority labels "maximum occupancy re-
strictions" does not exhaust the category of restrictions exempted from the
FHA by § 3607(b)(1). The plain words of the statute do not refer to "availa-
ble floor space or the number and type of rooms"; they embrace no require-
ment that the exempted restrictions "apply uniformly to all residents of all
dwelling units"; and they give no indication that such restrictions must have
the "purpose . . . to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling
overcrowding."
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plication of the exemption, but did not directly determine the
meaning of "reasonable."83
In City of Edmonds, a group home provider challenged a local
zoning restriction defining "family" for single family zones as dis-
criminatory under the FHAA. 4 The ordinance's definition of
"family" as "an individual or two or more persons related by genet-
ics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who
are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage" prevented the
operation of a ten to twelve person group home.8 5 The defendant
city claimed its zoning ordinance qualified for the exemption as a
reasonable occupancy standard.86 The district court held that the
Edmonds ordinance was exempt from the FHAA under Section
3607(b)(1).8 7 And the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the ordinance was not exempt.88
The meaning of "reasonable" was presented as part of the ques-
tion for review.8 9 The parties fully briefed the issue 90 and it was
Id. at 745-46. The decision's "plain language" reading was also criticized as a form of
"new textualism." Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 314-16 (1995). New textu-
alism is an interpretative method that "purports to discern a statute's 'plain lan-
guage,"' but is actually driven more by other concerns, such as policy interests. Id. at
314.
83. See infra note 92.
84. See 514 U.S. at 729-30.
85. See id. at 729.
86. See id. at 729-30.
87. See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Council, No. C91-215 (D.
Wash. July 14, 1992) (order on cross-motions for summary judgment).
88. See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802,
806-07 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. According to petitioners, the "Question Presented for Review" in Edmonds
was: "Does the traditional zoning definition of a 'single family,' established to limit
the use and occupancy of residences in single family residential zones, constitute a
,reasonable occupancy limitation' pursuant to the exemption created by the Fair
Housing Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 3607(b)(1) ... ?" Pet. for Writ of Cert.,
City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d 1802, at *1 (No. 94-23) 1994 WL 16011973. "At issue is
whether [Edmond's provisions] constitute such a reasonable occupancy limitation."
Id. at *3. The Respondents agreed that the issue involved the meaning of "reasona-
ble." "The question presented is whether the City's zoning provision falls within the
FHAA's exemption for reasonable maximum occupancy standards." Brief for Re-
spondents Oxford House, Inc. at *1, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23), 1994 WL 16012016.
90. Petitioner's specifically argued how the Edmonds ordinance was "reasonable"
throughout its Brief on the Merits. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *10, 18, 21-
22, 24-32, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23), 1994 WL 704077; Petitioner's Reply Brief on
the Merits, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23), 1995 WL 258886. The Pacific Legal Founda-
tion, an amicus curiae of the Petitioner, similarly contended that the ordinance was
"reasonable" in its brief. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief
amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari at *6-7, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23), 1994 WL 16012092. Respondents specifi-
cally discussed "the difficulty of divining an appropriate test" for the reasonable in the
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discussed in oral argument before the Supreme Court.9" The Su-
preme Court, however, did not address the meaning of "reasona-
ble" in its majority opinion,92 but it did give substantial guidance
on when the exemption should be applied. The Edmonds Court
explained that the provision "entirely exempts from the FHA's
compass 'any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions re-
garding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling.' '' 93 The Court held that, "Section 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption removes from the FHA's scope only total occupancy
limits, i.e. numerical ceilings that serve to prevent overcrowding in
living quarters" and not "provisions designed to foster the family
character of a neighborhood." 94  The Court continued,
"[m]aximum occupancy restrictions . . . cap the number of occu-
pants per dwelling, typically in relation to available floor space or
the number and type of rooms .... These restrictions ordinarily
apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units. Their purpose
exemption in their brief. Respondents' Brief at *14-15, 17-18, 32-35, 47, City of Ed-
monds (No. 94-23), 1994 WL 28444,.
91. At oral argument, the meaning of the "reasonable" standard was the very first
topic raised by Petitioner's counsel and discussed in colloquoy with the Justices. Oral
Argument of W. Scott Snyder on Behalf of the Petitioner at *4-11, City of Edmonds
(No. 94-23), 1995 WL 117624.
92. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. 725 (1995). Nowhere in the majority opinion does
the Court purport to interpret "reasonable." Justice Thomas, in dissent, mentions the
issue as not decided in two footnotes. First, he writes, "I would also remand the case
to the Court of Appeals to allow it to pass on respondents' argument that petitioner's
zoning code does not satisfy § 3607(b)(1)'s requirement that qualifying restrictions be
'reasonable."' Id. at 741 n.3. "[A]s I have already noted . . . restrictions must be
'reasonable' in order to be exempted by § 3607(b)(1)." Id. at 747 n.8.
93. Id. at 728. This type of regulation is often called a residential occupancy stan-
dard and is often contained in a local housing or building code. "Occupancy restric-
tions are typically found in housing codes. Housing codes... set minimum standards
for the occupancy of residential units. Items covered in such codes may include mini-
mum space per occupant .... The major purpose of housing codes is to prevent
overcrowding and the blighting of residential dwellings." City of Edmonds v. Wash-
ington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Justice Thomas, in dissent, identifies what the majority defines as the kind of regula-
tion eligible for the exemption as a form of "density control." Id. at 741. "Because
§ 503(b), as the majority describes it, 'caps the number of occupants a dwelling may
house, based on floor area,' .. . it actually caps the density of occupants, not their
number." Id.
94. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 728. The Court's description of the exemption as
"absolute" is curious and not based in language from any cited source. It may suggest




is to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling
overcrowding. 95
In contrast to residential occupancy standards, the Court held
that zoning regulations-such as definitions of "family" which
often include a limited number of unrelated persons allowed to re-
side in single-family zones but which primarily limit occupancy by
defining the permissible composition of household-were not eligi-
ble for the exemption.96
In excluding such zoning regulations, the majority embraced the
view that the type of regulations eligible for the exemption were
only those aimed at protecting health and safety. Other govern-
mental objectives, however legitimate they may be under the po-
lice power, could not support regulations that qualified for the
exemption. 97 The Court thereby reaffirmed the traditional health
and safety policy justification behind regulation of internal density
to prevent "overcrowding." 98
The Edmonds Court suggested a rationale for the exemption.
The exemption is justifiable as a means of protecting governments
from liability under FHAA when they fulfill their duty to protect
general health and safety of their residents by passing neutrally ap-
95. Id. at 733. The model occupancy codes cited by the Edmonds Court as exem-
plary are grounded in preventing overcrowding for health and safety purposes, for
example ensuring enough space for exit in case of fire or other emergency. See id.;
Letter from Kenneth M. Schoonover, Vice President, Codes and Standards, Building
Officials & Code Administrators International, Inc., to Clarine Nardi Riddle (Aug. 2,
1995) (on file with author) ("Occupancy limitations in existing buildings are regulated
as a health related issue .... The floor area allowances for residential occupancies...
are intended to establish the smallest number of occupants for whom exits must be
provided in new construction."). Public health and safety is the basis for the other
kinds of more familiar occupancy standards, for example restaurant, elevator, vehi-
cles, and public transportation.
96. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 734-35.
97. Id. at 733. Other zoning regulations do not necessarily violate the FHAA, but
they do not qualify for this exemption.
98. The Court also cited the majority in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977). City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 733-34. The Moore Court made the same point:
the purpose of maximum occupancy restrictions is to prevent overcrowding and for
related health and safety concerns. Moore, 431 U.S. at 521. Justice Stevens wrote, "to
prevent overcrowding, a community can certainly place a limit on the number of oc-
cupants in a household, either in absolute terms or in relation to the available floor
space." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, in dissent, also distinguished
restrictions designed to "preserv[e] the character" of a residential area from prescrip-
tion of "a minimum habitable floor area per person,"' in the interest of community
health and safety. Moore, 431 U.S. at 539; see Pader, Housing Occupancy Codes,
supra note 6 ("The official purpose of the standards is to promote health and safety by
eliminating undue overcrowding.").
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plied numerical limits on density.99 The Edmonds Court empha-
sized that its decision narrowly addressed the single question
before the Court-whether a zoning ordinance defining "family"
was eligible for the exemption. 100 The Court also stressed the
broad remedial nature of the FHAA and emphasized that this ex-
emption should be construed narrowly. 10 1
The City of Edmonds opinion seems to distinguish between gov-
ernmental occupancy regulations that are "eligible" for the exemp-
tion in the first place, and those that actually "qualify" for it by
being "reasonable.' 10 2 In fact, rather than interpret the "reasona-
ble" standard, the City of Edmonds Court offered an important
and significant narrowing of what governmental restrictions that
affect occupancy can be eligible for this exemption. In particular,
the City of Edmonds Court provides three eligibility criteria for the
exemption: 1) that it be a maximum numerical restriction on occu-
pancy (what this article will refer to as the "permissible type" re-
quirement);0 3 2) that the governmental restriction "apply to all
99. See City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. 725; see also Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d
975, 983 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The exemption contained in Sect. 3607(b)(1) relating to
maximum occupancy limitations is an attempt on the part of Congress to advance the
interests of the handicapped without interfering seriously with reasonable local zon-
ing."). HUD's view of the policy rationale behind the exemption complements this.
HUD explained that Congress provided this exemption to governmental entities in
part because of its intention that local and state governments take the lead in estab-
lishing fair housing standards: "While the statutory provision providing exemptions to
the Fair Housing Act states that nothing in the law limits the applicability of any
reasonable Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants, there is
no support in the statute or its legislative history which indicates any intent on the
part of Congress to provide for the development of a national occupancy code. This
interpretation is consistent with Congressional reliance on and encouragement for
States and localities to become active participants in the effort to promote achieve-
ment of the goal of Fair Housing." HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23,
1989). The FHA allowed states to adopt their own fair housing laws that could be
more protective of housing rights than the federal fair housing act. See generally 24
C.F.R. § 115.
100. See City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 730-32.
101. Id. at 731-32. "Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in which an
exception to a 'general statement of policy' is sensibly read 'narrowly in order to
preserve the primary operation of the [policy].' Id. (citations omitted).
102. Instead of defining "reasonable," the Edmonds Court created an eligibility
analysis that was not explicitly provided in the statute. This analysis, premised on a
"plain reading" of the statute, evoked a blistering dissent and other commentary criti-
cizing its textualism. See id. at 738-48.
103. See id. at 728. "[Section] 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption removes from the
FHA's scope only total occupancy limits, i.e. numerical ceilings that serve to prevent
overcrowding." Id.
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occupants" (the "uniform application" requirement); 104 and, 3)
that it be adopted for health and safety reasons to prevent over-
crowding (the "permissible purpose" requirement). 0 5 Without di-
rectly saying so, the City of Edmonds Court held that government
restrictions that met its eligibility criteria would qualify for the ex-
emption if they were "reasonable." But it left the task of defining
"reasonable" to lower courts. 10 6
2. The City of Richmond Heights Cases
In Fair Housing Advocates Assn. v. City of Richmond Heights,10 7
a local fair housing organization challenged the facially neutral oc-
cupancy ordinances of three cities in Ohio: the City of Bedford
Heights, the City of Fairview Park, and the City of Warrensville
Heights. 0 8 The City of Bedford Heights ordinance required "200
square feet of habitable space for the first person and 150 square
feet of habitable space for each additional person."10 9 The City of
Fairview Park's occupancy ordinance required "at least 300 square
feet of habitable floor area for the first occupant thereof and at
least 150 additional square feet . . . for every additional occu-
104. See id. at 733. "These restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of
all dwelling units." Id. (emphasis omitted).
105. See id. at 734 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-711, 100th Cong. (1988)). The Court
cites to the House Report to reinforce its interpretation of the exemption.
106. An interpretation of the Edmonds Court's opinion as supplying the definition
of reasonable, precisely in identifying the three requirements, fails because the Ed-
monds Court majority never purports to define "reasonable." And, the Court's ex-
plict "plain language" method could not plausibly interpret the single word
"reasonable" with such specificity. While no commentators addressing the issue have
interpreted Edmonds to define "reasonable," one state court did so in an unpublished
opinion applying its own state fair housing law. See CHRO v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No.
CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374, at *10-12 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001). Note that while
City of Edmonds effectively overruled City of Athens' holding as to what kinds of
governmental restrictions are eligible for the exemption, because the Edmonds Court
did not interpret the term "reasonable," it did not reach the Athens' Court interpreta-
tion of the term "reasonable."
107. 998 F. Supp. 825 (D. Ohio 1998). The city which gave the case its name, Rich-
mond Heights, was not a defendant at the time of trial. The plaintiff had filed a
stipulation voluntarily dismissing it. Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond
Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 628 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
108. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. at 825.
109. Id. at 827. The ordinance further requires a minimum of 650 square feet of
habitable space for dwellings having four occupants." Id. "Habitable floor area" is
generally defined in the ordinances as "the floor area in any room in any multiple
dwelling, which floor area is required to be contained within such multiple dwell-
ing... in order to meet the minimum requirements of this [Housing] Code." Id. A
"habitable room" is defined as "a room or enclosed floor space used or intended to be
used for living, sleeping, or eating purposes." Id. at 826-27.
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pant." 110 The City of Warrensville Heights occupancy ordinance
required "at least 350 square feet of habitable floor area for the
first occupant thereof and at least an additional 100 square feet...
for every additional occupant."'11  In their defense, the cities
claimed that their ordinances qualified for the reasonable govern-
mental occupancy restriction exemption. 112
In sum, the district court in City of Richmond Heights equated
"reasonable" to the "rational basis" standard used to test the con-
stitutionality of legislative acts adopted as exercises of the police
power for the general health, welfare, and safety. 113 The court sat-
isfied itself that the ordinances were eligible for the exemption
under City of Edmonds finding that "[t]he three ordinances at issue
in this trial place a cap on the total number of occupants per dwell-
ing unit based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit and
fall within the exemption from the Fair Housing Act's governance
found at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1). 111 4 The court then explained that
as exercises of "local government's police power on social legisla-
tion" the ordinances were "entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity."' 15 "Plaintiff has the burden to show that the ordinance is
unreasonable.""16 The court stated that the "city defendants need
only point out 'a state of facts either known or which could be rea-
sonably assumed' to support their ordinances in order to be enti-
110. Id. at 827. "Further, a minimum of 750 square feet is required for a dwelling
unit with four occupants. [E]ach bedroom in a dwelling unit must have a minimum of
80 square feet of habitable floor area for each bedroom for the first occupant and a
minimum of 50 square feet for each additional occupant." City of Richmond Heights,
209 F.3d at 629-30.
111. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. at 827. "Further, the occupancy ordi-
nance requires a minimum of 650 square feet of habitable space for dwellings with
four occupants." City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at 630.
112. See City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at 628-31.
113. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is the traditional
authority for the "rational basis" test. This same argument was made and developed
by the concurrence in the Sixth Circuit City of Richmond Heights case. 209 F.3d at
638-44. The district court recognized, however, that no HUD regulation was on point.
It noted that HUD's regulation regarding the exemption "tracks the language in 42
U.S.C. Sect. 3607(b)(1)." City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. at 830. It also
noted that "HUD has no current regulations that apply to local government restric-
tions ... that would be applicable to the defendants." Id. The court also mistakenly
cited another HUD regulation that was inapplicable, 24 C.F.R. 115.202(c), which con-
cerns HUD's determination of whether state fair housing laws can be certified as
equivalent with federal fair housing law. See id.
114. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. at 830. Here, the court partially ap-






tied to the presumption of validity."" 7 While the parties had each
introduced conflicting expert testimony as to the "reasonableness"
of the ordinances, the cities prevailed on the court's standard of
review because they had provided evidence for a rational basis and
the plaintiffs failed to show that the ordinances were
unreasonable." 8
By interpreting the "reasonable" standard to mean nothing more
than having a rational basis, the district court in City of Richmond
Heights held that any legislation that could survive a due process or
equal protection attack as constitutionally valid would also be "rea-
sonable" for purposes of the exemption to the FHAA. 1"9 On this
view of the reasonable standard, the FHAA provided no more
protection for families from discrimination by governments than
was already provided by the constitution for general social and ec-
onomic legislation. But in enacting the FHAA, Congress clearly
intended to go farther.12° The Richmond Heights district court's
opinion effectively read the word "reasonable" out of the statute,
contrary to fundamental principles of statutory interpretation."'
Standard canons of statutory interpretation and the Supreme
Court require that every word of a statute is given meaning and
effect if possible.'22
The Sixth Circuit City of Richmond Heights court rejected the
district court's interpretation of the "reasonable" test.123 In a care-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 830-31. In response to Plaintiff's evidence "tending to show that the
ordinances of the three defendant cities had a disproportionate impact on large fami-
lies seeking rental housing in these communities," the court, without further discus-
sion, simply concluded that Plaintiffs had not "shown the defendants intended to
discriminate against large families, or have actually done so." Id.
119. This article contends that "reasonable" must mean something more than
merely rational.
120. "The Supreme Court noted that courts must remain 'mindful of the Act's
stated policy to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States." Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n. v. City of Richmond Heights, 209
F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. 514 U.S.
725, 731 (1995)).
121. Combined with the "safe harbor" extension, such an interpretation could even
lead to the perverse result that a housing provider imposing a discriminatorily restric-
tive occupancy standard escapes liability under the FHAA by claiming a "safe har-
bor" exemption relying upon a similarly restrictive and discriminatory governmental
ordinance.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our
duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, rather than
emasculate a section.'") (citations omitted).
123. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at 636 (finding that the mere fact that an
occupancy restriction is part of a valid municipal ordinance "does not remove [it]
from the reasonableness requirement").
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fully crafted decision that considered the fair housing act statute,
its legislative history, and administrative regulations, 24 the Sixth
Circuit City of Richmond Heights court implicitly recognized the
City of Edmonds Court's apparent distinction between eligibility
for the exemption and qualifying for it.125 The Sixth Circuit went
on to hold that "[t]he exemption specifically requires that the ordi-
nances be 'reasonable,' and in interpreting that exemption, we
must give effect to this requirement. 126
Before doing that, however, the Sixth Circuit City of Richmond
Heights court clarified the allocation of the burden of proof and the
presumption of validity. Contrary to the district court's approach,
the Sixth Circuit agreed with those federal courts that "have re-
peatedly concluded that the party claiming the exemption 'carries
the burden of proving its eligibility for the exemption.' ,,127 There-
fore, the court reasoned, governmental restrictions challenged
under the FHAA do not enjoy a presumption of reasonableness.128
The Sixth Circuit City of Richmond Heights court found that the
ordinances at issue met all three eligibility requirements set forth
by the City of Edmonds Court.1 29 Regarding the uniform applica-
124. Id. at 633. The court cited the actual final rule and some language from
HUD's Preamble to the regulations.
125. Id. at 633 ("[The Edmonds] Court made clear that such restrictions are not
simply 'rubber stamped' by the courts, but instead, require some level of scrutiny.").
126. Id. at 636.
127. Id. at 634. The City of Richmond Heights court did not interpret this burden of
proof to be required by the "reasonable" standard but by a wholly separate principle.
Id. at 634-35.
128. The Sixth Circuit's holdings regarding the allocation of the burden of proof
have been followed by other courts. See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720
(E.D. Mich. 2000); CHRO v. J. E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374,
at *11. (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001). The dissent would have affirmed the district court's
decision. Beyond an attitude of extreme judicial deference to the legislative branch,
the only basis that the dissent offered to support this view are two quotes from the
City of Edmonds Court opinion that employed unfortunate phrasing but were not
endorsing this view. The City of Edmonds Court made a few statements that omitted
the phrase "reasonable" as a requirement for the exemption, and appeared to substi-
tute terms such as "complete" and "absolute." See, e.g., City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at
728 ("The case presents the question whether a provision in petitioner City of Ed-
monds zoning code qualifies for Sect. 3607(b)(1)'s complete exemption from FHA
scrutiny."). The court found that "rules that cap the total number of occupants in
order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling 'plainly and unmistakably' fall within
Sect. 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption." Id. at 735. "Instead, Sect. 3607(b)(1)'s abso-
lute exemption removes from the FHA's scope." Id. at 728.
129. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626. In fact, however, this finding was
contrary to the evidence as found by the district court. At least one of the ordinances
(Bedford Heights) did not meet it because it applied "only to multi-family units of
two or more units," thus applying only to some rental dwellings and not to all re-
sidents in all dwelling units. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. 825, 828 (1998).
OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS
tion requirement, in its findings the Sixth Circuit City of Richmond
Heights court stated: "[f]irst, the Cities' occupancy ordinances 'ap-
ply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units.' 1 30 Regarding
the permissible purpose requirement, the Sixth Circuit City of
Richmond Heights court found "the Cities have presented convinc-
ing evidence that the ordinances were enacted 'to protect health
and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding." ' 1 31 Regarding
the permissible type requirement, the Sixth Circuit City of Rich-
mond Heights court explicitly found that the ordinances were ordi-
nances regarding "the maximum number of occupants permitted to
occupy a dwelling," as required by the plain language of the
statute.
132
The court then turned to the "reasonableness inquiry."' 33 Ini-
tially, the court considered the form of occupancy standards that
the defendant cities had adopted-a minimum square feet per per-
son form-and the particular numerical standards that each city
had adopted. 134 The plaintiffs had argued that only a two-person
per bedroom standard or a less restrictive minimum square foot
per person standard would be reasonable. 135 But the court recalled
that "Congress made clear that there is no national occupancy stan-
dard.' 36 Then, without further explanation, the court interpreted
the reasonableness inquiry to require the court to give judicial def-
erence to the exercise of legislative discretion. 37 The court held
that selecting any particular actual standard was a "legislative, not
a judicial function,' 13 citing as authority a case that employed a
rational basis test.139 The court concluded that the conflicting evi-
130. 209 F.3d at 636 (citing City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 733).
131. Id. at 636.
132. Id. at 633.
133. Id. at 635-38.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 636.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 636-37 (noting that "[t]he Cities were surely permitted to choose
which of these standards was the most appropriate for that particular city.").
138. Id. at 637. This distinction is used in considering the constitutionality of law.
See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (stating that "[t]hat
exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial function" in upholding a
zoning ordinance against a constitutional challenge); Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d
315, 319 (1989) ("Therefore we believe that for due process purposes this ordinance
must be evaluated under the same reasonableness standard applicable to the vast ma-
jority of legislative judgments relating to zoning.").
139. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at 637. "The rationale of Oxford House
applies with equal force here. The 'exercise of discretion' as to whether to require a
minimum of 650 square feet for an apartment of four people, as opposed to a mini-
mum of 500 square feet or 800 square feet, is a legislative, not a judicial function." Id.
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dence in the trial record sufficiently met the cities' burden. 140 It
therefore affirmed the district court's judgment, albeit on different
grounds. 1 '
The Sixth Circuit correctly required that the government seeking
the benefit of the exemption bear the burden of proof, but the
court imposed too light a burden on the government by interpret-
ing the "reasonable" inquiry to be a deferential standard of review
based upon the legislative character of the ordinance at issue. 142
Unlike Elliot v. City of Athens, 43 to which I now turn, neither
the City of Richmond Heights district court decision nor the Sixth
Circuit's opinion included a non-discriminatory requirement in its
reasonable standard.
The Sixth Circuit City of Richmond Heights court is citing Oxford House-C v. City of
St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996). The Oxford House-C court applied the rational
basis test to an occupancy standard limiting unrelated adults, citing Village of Belle
Terre. Id. at 252.
140. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at 638.
141. Id. The evidence included expert testimony about occupancy standards, the
reasons for adopting the ordinances, the participation of landlords and management
companies in setting the standards, and more. Id. at 631. The court describes the
cities' evidence with regard to the permissible purpose requirement as "convincing"
despite the fact that "Housing Advocates further established that the Cities did not
conduct any formal studies before enacting their respective ordinances." See id.
"Before enacting the ordinances, none of the municipalities in this action conducted
or reviewed studies or reports to determine the existence of overcrowding or what
would constitute a reasonable occupancy standard." Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v.
City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp. 825, 827 (1998). Interestingly, the evidence
included testimony by landlords who followed their own "two-person-per-bedroom"
-standard despite the city's more restrictive standards and there had been no enforce-
ment of the city's standards against them. Id. at 828. A careful reading of the case
suggests that, despite its clarification of the burdens of proof, the court continued to
require the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged ordinances were unreasona-
ble. The court found that despite the trial having been conducted employing incorrect
burdens of proof that there was sufficient evidence in the record to find that the chal-
lenged ordinances qualified for the exemption as "reasonable" and, contrary to plain-
tiff's request, no remand was required. See City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d at
635-36.
142. As further evidence that the Sixth Circuit City of Richmond Heights court did
not include a non-discriminatory element in its "reasonable" test, after it completed
its analysis of the exemption in which it found that ordinances at issue were "reasona-
ble" and qualified for the exemption, the court then considered plaintiff's argument
that "the occupancy ordinances were invalid because they (1) were enacted to dis-
criminate against families of four; and (2) had a discriminatory impact on families of
four." 209 F.3d at 637-38. It then purported to apply an analysis of whether or not
the governmental ordinances under review were discriminatory under the FHAA.
See id.
143. No. CIV.A.89-89-ATH, 1991 WL 388125 (D. Ga. Jan. 23, 1991).
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3. City of Athens
In Elliott v. City of Athens,' 4 an organization seeking to estab-
lish a group home for recovering alcoholics challenged a single-
family zoning ordinance as violating the FHAA.145 The ordinance
defined "family" as "one (1) or more persons occupying a single
dwelling unit, provided that unless all members are related by
blood, marriage, or adoption, no such family shall contain over
four (4) persons."'1 46 The defendant claimed the benefit of the ex-
emption, while the plaintiff claimed the ordinance was "unreasona-
ble because it has a disparate impact on handicapped
individuals. ' 147 The district court found the zoning ordinance to be
exempt under the FHA as a reasonable governmental restriction
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1), 148 and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.149
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit City of Athens court explic-
itly addressed the "reasonable" requirement. 50  The court ex-
plained: "In determining the reasonableness of the ordinance, this
court must strike a balance between a municipality's interest in
maintaining the residential character of a particular area and the
interests of the handicapped in remaining free from a zoning re-
striction.' 151 The court found the plaintiff's evidence of discrimina-
tory impact was weak.'52 It stated, "there was no attempt to
establish that the ordinance had a harsher effect on handicapped
persons wanting to live in group homes than on college students or
other non-handicapped persons desiring to live in group homes. "153
In contrast, the court found that the city had a "very substantial
interest in controlling density, traffic, and noise in single family res-
idential districts, and in preserving the residential character of such
144. Id.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 976 (11th Cir. 1992).
147. Id. at 981.
148. Elliot, 1991 WL 388125, at *6.
149. Id.
150. Elliot, 960 F.2d at 981. The City of Athens court was the first appellate court to
directly interpret the reasonableness requirement of the exemption. See id. at 984.
151. Id. at 981. For authority, the court cited Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1985), a Supreme Court case applying § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id.
152. See id. The plaintiff only offered the fact of the denial of its own proposed
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districts. ' 154 The city's purpose was "to control the large Univer-
sity of Georgia student population" and its negative effects.1 55 The
defendant had provided expert testimony documenting the particu-
lar harms that persistent overcrowding of students had wrought in
a neighborhood.156 The Court accepted the district court's finding
that the municipality's definition of family which limited the num-
ber of unrelated persons permitted to occupy a single dwelling was
"the most practical means of accomplishing the City's legitimate
interests."' 57 The court further reasoned that the exclusion of
group homes such as the one proposed by appellants was only an
"incidental effect" of the restriction.5 8 The court concluded that
"the zoning restriction as applied in this case is reasonable, and
thus the exemption is applicable." '159
The City of Athens court interprets "reasonable" to mean "non-
discriminatory" because it specifically balances the defendant city's
interests in regulating overcrowding with the discriminatory impact
of that policy on members of the protected class. In noting that the
negative effects on the plaintiffs were only an "incidental effect" of
the restriction, the court implies that if the discriminatory effects
had been "substantial," it would have found the ordinance
"unreasonable."
154. Id. at 982. There is a long history of strong judicial deference to municipalities
zoning regulations to provide for and protect "single family zones." See, e.g., Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926). Note that the "density" at issue here is not internal density but
neighborhood density, for example number of units per acre.
155. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 982 (11th Cir. 1992).
156. See id.
157. Id. Later the opinion refers to the limitation as "the only practical method of
serving its legitimate interests." Id. at 983.
158. Id. at 982. Other evidence showed that such group homes "would be permit-
ted in other residential areas of the city as well as non-residential areas." Id.
159. Id. at 983. The dissent also interpreted "reasonable" in the statutory language
to encompass non-discriminatory but argued that "reasonable accommodation" anal-
ysis was appropriate instead of disparate impact analysis. See id. at 984-88 (Kravitch,
J., dissenting). Citing the legislative history of the exemption, the dissent predicted
the City of Edmonds Court's interpretation regarding the "uniform application" and
"permissible type" eligibility requirements. Id. It disagreed with the majority's inter-
pretation of "reasonable" as requiring a balancing test. Id. The dissent also raises the
complex and to some degree parallel question addressed by this article: how the "rea-
sonable accommodation" requirement included in the FHAA for persons with disa-
bility is to be considered in conjunction with the FHAA's exemption for "reasonable"




No cases that have cited City of Athens have discussed its inter-
pretation of "reasonable" to mean nondiscriminatory.1 60 The prob-
able reason for this is that the City of Athens court's primary
holding was later overruled by the Supreme Court in City of Ed-
monds, discussed in Part II.A.1.
B. The Meaning of "Reasonable"
In applying the exemption to governmental entities, courts have
struggled with the meaning of "reasonable" in the context of this
exemption. "Reasonable" is not defined in the statute and is indis-
putably ambiguous. Thus, courts must look to relevant regulations,
the rest of the statute, and legislative history to determine its
meaning. As the federal agency charged with implementing the
FHAA, HUD's guidance, if any, would be relevant and worthy of
consideration and perhaps even given deference by the courts.1 61
Unfortunately, HUD's guidance on this issue has been minimal
and unhelpful because it has not offered a meaning for
"reasonable."162
When a statute is ambiguous and no regulation is applicable, leg-
islative history can provide guidance to courts.163 In this case,
there is only one committee report to consider, but courts and
commentators have not given it sufficient attention. Referring to
the exemption, the House Report states, "Reasonable governmen-
tal limitations by governments [on occupancy] would be allowed to
continue, as long as they were applied to all occupants, and did not
160. Secondary sources generally criticize the City of Athens opinion in light of the
later City of Edmonds opinion overruling its primary holding. See, e.g., Scott Casher,
Closing a Loophole in the Fair Housing Act: City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995), 70 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 387-89 (1997).
161. In certain cases, courts must defer to authoritative interpretations of federal
statutes by federal agencies charged with administering them. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984). See generally Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833 (2001).
162. The 1989 regulation merely repeats the statutory language. 24 C.F.R.
§100.10(a)(3) (2004). The Preamble to the final regulations merely quotes the House
Report. HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (Jan. 23. 1989). Since the 1989 regulation,
HUD has not provided any guidance on what constitutes a "reasonable" governmen-
tal occupancy restriction. In contrast, HUD has provided extensive guidance on the
application of the FHAA to private housing providers, albeit without ever adopting
any formal regulation.
163. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof'l Real
Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 280 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989). "The authoritative source
for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill." Garcia
v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
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operate to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, or familial status.". 64
The House Report language explicitly requires that governmen-
tal restrictions qualifying for the exemption be non-discriminatory.
The House Report's "did not operate to discriminate" language is
cited in full in Supreme Court's City of Edmonds opinion,'65 in the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in City of Richmond Heights,66 and in the
Eleventh Circuit's City of Athens opinion.167 Only the City of Ath-
ens opinion appears to use it to define the "reasonable"
standard. 168
Yet, when read with the Edmonds opinion, the overlooked lan-
guage in the House Report is the key to defining the meaning of
"reasonable." The word "reasonable" itself is ambiguous, and not
amenable to a "plain reading" interpretation.1 69 There are no au-
thoritative regulations available to assist courts in interpreting it.
164. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., at 31 (1988) (emphasis added).
165. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 734 (1995).
166. Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n. v. City of City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp.
825, 832 (D. Ohio 1998). Interestingly, in its review of the exemption's legislative
history, but before actually defining its test, the Sixth Circuit City of Richmond
Heights court implicitly acknowledged that the governmental occupancy restriction
must be non-discriminatory. "Despite its broad goal of eradicating discrimination in
housing based on familial status, however, Congress also recognized the legitimate
interests local and state governments have in enacting non-discriminatory occupancy
restrictions." Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n. v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626,
632 (6th Cir. 2000).
167. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 1992). It is also cited in
United States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June
16, 1997).
168. See generally Elliot, 906 F.2d at 975.
169. I have argued, above, that the City of Edmonds opinion did not interpret the
term "reasonable," but can be read to distinguish between "eligibility" for the exemp-
tion and "qualification" for it by being "reasonable." See supra Part II.A.1. Clearly,
the City of Edmonds Court's eligibility criteria for the exemption alone do not ensure
that a governmental restriction is non-discriminatory because a restriction that satis-
fies all three eligibility criteria may still be discriminatory towards families. For exam-
ple, an occupancy restriction requiring 300 square feet per person which applied to all
dwellings in order to protect health and safety caused by overcrowding would meet all
of the eligibility criteria, but would certainly have a disparate impact on families, es-
pecially families of color. The City of Edmonds Court's apparent reluctance to define
"reasonable" may be related to the fact that it purported to provide a "plain reading"
of the statutory language. The City of Edmonds Court referred to the House Report
language to reinforce its reading of the exemption, in particular, the permissible type
requirement. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 734 n.8 (1995).
The dissent explicitly distinguished itself from the majority by not taking a position on
the authority of House Report and legislative history. See id. at 746. Interestingly,
the defendant cities in the City of Richmond Heights case asserted that their ordi-
nances were "valid, non-discriminatory efforts to limit occupancy." City of Richmond
Heights, 209 F.3d at 633.
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The House Report is the only source available of what Congress
might have intended "reasonable" to mean. It is part of the mea-
ger but authoritative legislative history of the exemption. And, the
language in the House Report clearly intends that the exemption
only encompass non-discriminatory governmental restrictions.
Therefore, the "did not operate to discriminate" language in the
House Report must supply the meaning for the "reasonable" stan-
dard;170 no other statutory language or other legislative history can
do S0. 1 7 1 And given the remedial purpose of the statute, it makes
sense that Congress would not want governmental occupancy re-
strictions that were discriminatory to qualify for this exemption.
Because "reasonable" must mean non-discriminatory, both the
district court and Sixth Circuit opinions in City of Richmond
Heights must be rejected because they fail to offer an adequate
interpretation for the term since neither included a non-discrimina-
tory requirement as part of their "reasonable" test. The City of
Athens opinion did adopt a non-discriminatory meaning for "rea-
sonable," and it will be revisited, in Part D for consideration of the
adequacy of its definition.
C. The Duplication Problem and Its Solution
The conclusion that "reasonable" must mean "non-discrimina-
tory" leads to a quandary: How can there be both a non-discrimi-
natory test to qualify for the exemption and a non-discriminatory
test for governmental restrictions that do not qualify for the ex-
emption and are subject to the statute? 172
170. One commentator who considered this issue disagrees. Casher, supra note
160. In light of the City of Edmonds case, he criticizes the City of Athens court's
interpretation of reasonable as meaning non-discriminatory. Id. "The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's analysis mistakenly equated 'reasonable' under 3607(b)(1) with 'constitutional'
and 'nondiscriminatory," and it confused the issue of compliance with the issue of
exemption." Id. at 388. His criticism appears to be that understanding "reasonable"
to mean non-discriminatory requires a court to consider the merits of an ordinance
which is not required when a typical "exemption" operates. He offers, however, no
alternative meaning for "reasonable" and therefore, like the lower court in City of
Richmond Heights, effectively reads it out of the statute. And, as this article argues,
since the "exemption" is best understood as a special defense, consideration of the
merits is appropriate.
171. Also, the City of Edmonds Court appealed to the first sentence in this two-
sentence passage in the House Report to support its interpretation of the exemption.
Without some justification it seems odd to ignore the next sentence in the same
source when it too was included in the Court's citation.
172. This quandary may be part of the reason the City of Edmonds Court avoided
defining "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue was fully briefed and discussed in
oral argument. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, City of Edmonds (No. 94-23),
1994 WL 704077; Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits, City of Edmonds (No. 94-
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There seem to be two possibilities for resolving this quandary,
both of which are problematic. One possibility is that there are
two non-discriminatory standards, one for qualification for the ex-
emption (the "reasonable" standard), and a different one for re-
view of a governmental occupancy restriction that does not qualify
for the exemption. The second possibility is that the "reasonable"
standard is the only standard applicable to review governmental oc-
cupancy standards for compliance with the FHAA.
Regarding the first possibility-that-there are two non-discrimi-
natory standards-it initially appears that this solution would most
completely effectuate the structure Congress appears to have in-
tended in designing the FHAA. When Congress used the term
"exemption," it seemed to contemplate that some governmental
occupancy restrictions (those qualifying for the exemption) would
not be reviewed further by courts, while others (those not qualify-
ing for the exemption) would be subject to full review for compli-
ance with the FHAA. This solution, which requires the
articulation of two non-discriminatory standards of review, how-
ever, only creates a further problem. If qualifying for the exemp-
tion requires that a governmental restriction be "non-
discriminatory," what good is the exemption, since if a govern-
ment's ordinance does not discriminate, it does not need an
exemption?173
This concern might be met if the two standards required differ-
ent kinds of proof of non-discrimination. One possibility would be
that the exemption would apply to government ordinances that
were not facially discriminatory or perhaps if there was no evi-
dence of intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment
theory. On this view, Congress intended to prevent blatant or in-
tentional discrimination by governments in setting their occupancy
standards, but would grant the exemption to neutral standards that
nevertheless had some disparate impact. This view is bolstered by
the City of Edmonds Court's requirements mandating that only
ordinances that are neutral on their face will be eligible for the ex-
23), 1995 WL 258886. Some of the arguments by the parties in their briefs specifically
refer to this problem.
173. See Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
dissent's interpretation of "reasonable" requiring the court to apply the "reasonable
accommodation" analysis to determine "reasonableness" for the purposes of the ex-
emption "would effectively nullify the exemption; that is, under the dissent's construc-
tion, the only time the exemption could apply is when there is no statutory violation
in the first place.").
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emption. 17 4 The argument would go that once such ordinances are
shown to be neutral, they are immune from further challenge
under the FHAA.
While plausible, this solution seems wrong. First, this solution
would credit the City of Edmonds Court with defining "reasona-
ble" which it clearly did not do. Second, this position would be
contrary to the language of the House Report in which the non-
discrimination requirement is stated as: "did not operate to dis-
criminate.117 5 When this language appears in other contexts, it
usually refers to disparate impact-type discrimination.176 It is hard
to argue that Congress was unaware of the distinction between dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination in
1988. So, given its choice of words, Congress seems to have in-
tended that in order to qualify for the exemption a governmental
restriction must not be discriminatory on a disparate impact the-
ory.177 Third, this solution would undercut the remedial goals of
the statute emphasized by the Edmonds Court by exempting from
FHAA liability neutral occupancy standards that nonetheless
discriminate.
Yet, the conclusion that governmental occupancy restrictions
must be non-discriminatory under a disparate impact theory to
qualify for the exemption raises the difficult question of what the
other discriminatory standard would be for governmental restric-
tions not qualifying for the exemption (i.e. subject to the FHAA)
and what benefit the exemption provides to government
defendants.
Logically, if both are non-discriminatory standards, the standard
for liability under the statute could certainly not be less demanding
than the standard to qualify for an exemption from the statute. But
if the test to qualify for the exemption is based upon a disparate
impact theory of discrimination, what test for discrimination could
174. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
175. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
176. Pre-1988 cases using "operate to discriminate" to mean disparate impact dis-
crimination include: Justice Stevens dissenting in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 678 n.29 (1989) (describing the critical inquiry into disparate impact
theory, "is whether an employer's practices operate to discriminate. Whether the
employer intended such discrimination is irrelevant."); Pouncy v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) (employment discrimination); Hor-
ace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1980) (Title VII sex discrimination); and
Clark v. Alexander, 489 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1980) (Title VII sex discrimination).
177. Also, the use of this phrase demonstrates that Congress was aware of this the-
ory of liability in fair housing cases, and, at least in the context of challenges to gov-
ernmental occupancy restrictions under the FHAA, appears to have endorsed it.
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be more demanding to use for ordinances that failed to qualify for
the exemption? The conduct considered "discriminatory" under a
disparate treatment theory is a subset of the conduct that would be
"discriminatory" under a disparate impact theory. 178
This problem combined with the fact that qualifying for the ex-
emption would be functionally the same as defending against liabil-
ity under the statute on the merits in turn raises the issue of
whether the "exemption" is really an "exemption" in the tradi-
tional sense of an affirmative defense not requiring consideration
of the merits. Usually, if a statute includes an exemption provision,
it is possible in principle for a challenged law to not qualify for the
exemption and then to be either found to violate or not to violate
the statute. If a governmental restriction must be "non-discrimina-
tory" under a disparate impact theory to qualify for the exemption,
however, any governmental restriction that fails to qualify for the
exemption will almost certainly be found to violate the statute.
In conclusion, it appears impossible to articulate two distinct
non-discriminatory standards: one to qualify for exemption under a
disparate impact theory and a different one to test for a violation
of the statute on the merits if a governmental restriction does not
qualify for the exemption.
The second possibility-that the "reasonable" standard is the
only standard applicable to review governmental occupancy stan-
dards for compliance with the FHAA-is the best solution. The
argument is that despite naming the defense an "exemption," in
fact Congress provided for only one defense and only one standard
of review for governmental occupancy restrictions-that they be
"reasonable." Under this view, if a governmental occupancy re-
striction is not "reasonable," it violates the FHAA. There is no
other standard of review.
Under this interpretation, the "reasonable" standard does not
function as a typical "exemption" or affirmative defense because it
178. Intentional discrimination is the focus of disparate treatment analysis. Dispa-
rate impact analysis casts a wider net than disparate treatment analysis because dispa-
rate impact theory defines more conduct as potentially "discriminatory" than
disparate treatment analysis. It is not hard to identify rules that have discriminatory
impacts but would not be found to constitute discrimination under a disparate treat-
ment analysis. It is hard to imagine the reverse: a rule that is discriminatory in that it
fails a disparate treatment analysis but does not have any discriminatory disparate
impacts. Intentional discrimination that does not also have an adverse impact on pro-
tected classes would be ineffective discrimination, so while still unlawful, it is not
much to worry about.
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engages the court in considering the merits. 179 "Exemptions" are
usually treated as affirmative defenses: the defendant must raise
them in its answer to a complaint and the defendant bears the bur-
den of proving that it is eligible for the defense.18 0 Generally, ex-
emptions are meant to give clear notice of what is covered or not
by a statute. Usually, proving eligibility for an exemption is often a
matter of proving that the entity charged or the activity claimed to
violate the act do not come under the coverage of the statute by
reference to some definition. In other words, exemptions usually
take an entity or an activity out of the scope of a statute by virtue
of some characteristic of the entity or an activity. What is required
is proof of fitting the exemption definition, not proving that the
entity is not liable for a substantive violation under the statute. For
a defendant, the ability to prove that it fits an exemption saves it
most of the costs of defending against the claim.' 81
This solution is also problematic. Initially, this solution appears
to render the exemption a nullity which courts should avoid if at all
possible. Upon further consideration, however, this solution does
effectuate the intent of Congress understood as enacting the ex-
emption to provide for a particular defense for certain governmen-
tal occupancy restrictions employing a "reasonable" standard of
liability. It just is not a traditional "exemption." On this analysis,
the "exemption" specifies a different standard of liability for gov-
179. In each of the other exemptions explicitly provided in the FHAA, parties
seeking to take advantage of the exemption merely need to demonstrate that they fit
within the definition of the exemption. Regarding religious organizations, see United
States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 877 (3rd Cir. 1990) (country club not
controlled by or operated in conjunction with a church did not qualify for religious
organization exemption); United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544
(D. Va. 1975) (exemption for certain religious organizations is to be read strictly and
not apply to a children's home which was open to children of all creeds). Regarding
private clubs, see Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (country club homes were
not "lodgings" under the exemption). Regarding housing for older persons exemp-
tion, see Lanier v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (not
qualifying for exemption because of location and failure to provide relevant services).
180. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
181. Yet, sometimes a defendant must put on substantial evidence to demonstrate
its eligibility for an exemption, particularly in regard to the FHAA "housing for older
persons" exemption. See, e.g., Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993)
(to qualify for "older persons" exemption, defendants need to show that they are
operating housing specifically designed for older persons by showing that "at least
80% of the units are occupied by at least one person age 55 or older[,] that they have
published and adhered to policies and procedures that demonstrate an intent to re-
strict leasing to those age 55 or older, [and] that they provide services specifically
designed to meet the needs of older persons, or if the provision of such services is
impractical, that [the housing] is needed to provide important housing opportunities
for older persons in the community").
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ernments than for private parties. 18 2 It does not render the provi-
sion a nullity because it plausibly makes the provision operate in a
manner effectuating the intent of Congress.
Assuming that "reasonable" means non-discriminatory under a
disparate impact theory, and that the provision styled as an "ex-
emption" is actually a special defense for certain governmental oc-
cupancy standards, a complete clarification of the provision still
requires a definition for what the one "reasonable" standard would
be that is distinct from the standard disparate impact analysis.183
D. Two Proposed "Reasonable" Standards: City of
Athens Revisited
This section will articulate two alternative "reasonable" stan-
dards that courts could apply to determine if a defendant govern-
ment qualifies for the special defense the Congress created in 42
U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1). Because of the "not operate to discriminate"
phrasing, the traditional disparate impact analyses applied to gov-
ernment defendants in fair housing cases, such as Village of Arling-
ton Heights184 and Town of Huntingtonx85 provide the initial point
of reference. Yet, the reasonable standard should be distinct from
these to give meaning to the "reasonable" term which appears to
suggest something of an easier standard than traditional disparate
impact liability.186
182. The idea that governments should be subject to a different standard of liability
under a disparate impact theory from private parties has been endorsed by a careful
analysis of disparate impact theory in the Fair Housing Act. See Peter Mahoney, The
End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending
Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998). While the "safe
harbor" extension of the exemption effectively extends this same standard of review
to private parties, this occurs only at the option of private parties who must qualify for
this defense. Otherwise, they are subject to a different standard of liability.
183. This conclusion does not leave the same quandary as before because the task is
now to articulate two different non-discriminatory standards for two different situa-
tions. If an occupancy standard meets all the eligibility requirements, meeting the
"reasonable" standard is the only defense available for it. If it does not meet the
requirements, then it violates FHAA. It is then no longer subject to review under the
statute by the application of another non-discriminatory test. But, the "reasonable"
standard must be distinct from the standard disparate impact analysis, otherwise the
special defense would be a nullity. See supra Part III.
184. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir.
1977).
185. NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. This article does not address the disputed issue of whether a disparate impact
test under the FHAA does or should include an intent element because it assumes
that in selecting a standard for the defense, Congress did not intend that governments
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The City of Athens court's interpretation of the "reasonable"
standard as non-discriminatory was never reached by the City of
Edmonds Court and deserves reconsideration.' 87 Two versions of a
"reasonable" standard can be derived from the City of Athens
opinion. In the "reasonable balance" version, a court would bal-
ance the benefits of local government's health and safety objectives
in regulating overcrowding with the costs in discrimination to fami-
lies, ensuring that any discrimination caused by the regulation is
only "incidental" not substantial. In the "reasonable means-ends
fit" version, a court would scrutinize the fit between the local gov-
ernment's stated health and safety objectives and the actual conse-
quences of the specific ordinance in preventing or reducing
overcrowding, ensuring that any discrimination caused by the regu-
lation is only "incidental" and not substantial.
The City of Athens court contemplated that litigation regarding
the exemption would proceed in the following way: First, the plain-
tiff must produce evidence of the discriminatory impact of the re-
striction. 88 Second, the government bears the burden of proving
that it qualifies for the exemption and must produce evidence that
its specific occupancy restriction serves its stated purpose. 189 Then,
the court balances the governmental interests actually served by
the restriction against the discriminatory impacts of the restric-
tion.190 In its discussion, the City of Athens court characterized the
ordinance at issue as having only an "incidental effect" on the in-
terests of the protected class and as the "most practical means" of
serving the governmental interest. 191
prove they have no discriminatory intent. For a good discussion of this issue, see Ma-
honey, supra note 182.
187. The City of Athens court's primary holding-that a zoning ordinance "defining
family" from the FHAA qualified for the 42 § U.S.C. 3607(b)(1) exemption-was
abrogated by the City of Edmonds Court's holding that such a zoning ordinance was
not eligible for the exemption because it was not a "maximum occupancy limitation."
See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 730 (1995). Professor
Schwemm's treatise on fair housing law queries the ongoing vitality of the City of
Athen's reasonable standard. See HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION,
supra note 28, § 9:6.
188. See Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. "As noted above, and as the district court found ... the most practical
means of accomplishing the City's legitimate interests was a limitation on the number
of unrelated persons permitted to occupy a single dwelling." Id. at 982. "In addition,
of course, the restriction had the incidental effect of excluding group homes such as
the one proposed by appellants." Id.
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In light of the preceding analysis, the City of Athens opinion of-
fers a promising basis for defining the "reasonable" standard for
governments' occupancy standards.192 For example, placing the
burden on government to prove its qualification for the defense
was correct.193 But since the City of Athens case was decided
before the City of Edmonds, the City of Athens' "reasonable" test
must be refined to include the relevant holdings from that case, in
particular, the permissible purpose requirement. The types of gov-
ernmental interests balanced in the City of Athens decision in-
cluded controlling density, traffic, and noise in single family
residential districts, but primarily "preserving the residential char-
acter" of such districts.194 But, the City of Edmonds Court limited
the "permissible objectives" of government in occupancy restric-
tions to health and safety reasons to prevent overcrowding. 195
Governments often present a variety of objectives as to their ef-
forts to reduce or prevent "overcrowding. ' 196 Many of these are
192. In any appropriate test, for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the occupancy re-
striction causes a disparate impact on the protected class, they would typically need to
demonstrate the restriction's disproportionate impact on members of the protected
class using population statistics (e.g. numbers of households that consist of certain
numbers and how many of these household are families with children) and housing
statistics (e.g. the capacity and configuration of the existing housing stock in the juris-
diction). See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003)
(explaining appropriate comparisons required for plaintiff's prima facie case under
the Town of Huntington analysis). A prima facie case of disparate impact requires a
comparison between two groups-those affected and those unaffected by the facially
neutral policy. The comparison must reveal (generally by statistics) that the chal-
lenged policy imposes a "significantly adverse or disproportionate impact" on a pro-
tected group of persons. In the case of a plaintiff demonstrating that an occupancy
policy creates a disparate impact burdening familial status she must show that occu-
pancy policy actually or predictably creates a shortage of housing for a significant
number of family households compared to (similarly-situated) non-family households.
In other words, she must show: 1) that X% of all of the protected group need (or have
good reason) to live in the [housing] but are prohibited by the facially neutral occu-
pancy policy; 2) that Y% of all of the non-protected class need (or have good reason)
to live in [same housing] are prohibited by the facially neutral occupancy policy; and
3) that X is significantly greater than Y. Plaintiff's prima facie case would depend
upon other zoning and housing supply facts. Her evidence should focus on the local
housing market and local family statistics (not national statistics), including the char-
acteristics of class members' households living in the jurisdiction or wanting to live
there and the availability of three bedroom or four bedroom or other relevant hous-
ing in the jurisdiction.
193. Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 634-35
(6th Cir. 2000).
194. See Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 982 (11th Cir. 1992).
195. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
196. In City of Athens, the city's primary stated objective was not "health and




not related to "health and safety." While other objectives, such as
general welfare objectives raised in the City of Athens case, may be
relevant for consideration of the ordinance's constitutional validity
for purposes of due process and equal protection, under City of
Edmonds they are not relevant for purposes of avoiding liability
under the FHAA. Rather, under City of Edmonds' permissible
purpose requirement, the government must show that its restric-
tion is "reasonable" based only upon health and safety grounds.1 97
In addition to comporting with the City of Edmonds opinion, the
City of Athens' "reasonable" test should reflect but not be the same
as traditional disparate impact analyses applied to government de-
fendants in fair housing cases, such as Village of Arlington Heights
and Town of Huntington. The two primary models for disparate
impact analysis in FHAA for government defendants are: Town of
Huntington198 and the four prong test of the Seventh Circuit on
remand in Village of Arlington Heights.1 99 Both include considera-
tion of the government's interest in the challenged policy or prac-
tice and the extent of discriminatory impact caused by that policy
or practice. In light of the Town of Huntington and Village of Ar-
lington Heights analyses, the City of Athens analysis could be inter-
preted in two ways with two different emphases.
1. The "Reasonable Balance" Standard
The City of Athens court defined its analysis as "strik[ing] a bal-
ance between a municipality's interest in maintaining the residen-
tial character of a particular area and the interests of the
handicapped in remaining free from a zoning restriction. ' 20 0 This
balancing of the government's interests with the interests of the
persons burdened by the regulation construes the "reasonableness"
standard to be something akin to a "constitutional" test such as
those used in first amendment, equal protection, and due process
cases. One astute commentary on the appropriate standards in dis-
197. As explained in more detail below, this requirement might constitute a signifi-
cant limitation on restrictions that governments could adopt that would pass muster
under this standard. For a similar limitation on the permissible governmental reasons
to exercise police power, see California Government Code § 65589.5 (2004) (requir-
ing local governments which want to deny use permits for qualifying affordable hous-
ing to making findings regarding specific adverse health and safety impacts, not
general welfare reasons).
198. NAACP v. City of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
199. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292
(7th Cir. 1977).
200. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
2004] 1253
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
parate impact jurisprudence in fair housing cases argues that such a
balancing test is appropriate for government defendants because of
the important differences between government defendants (whose
collective "intentions" are hard to fathom and reliably identify)
and private defendants (whose "intentions" may be more coherent
and susceptible to proof).20 1
Merely balancing the health and safety benefits a government
received with the extent of discriminatory impact caused by the
occupancy restriction at issue is insufficient as a "reasonable" stan-
dard because it fails to sufficiently reflect the anti-discriminatory
concerns of the FHAA. The City of Athens court's consideration
of whether the discriminatory effect is "incidental" or "substantial"
may provide the necessary missing element. This standard would
provide a court with more direction in how to strike the appropri-
ate balance.
2. The "Reasonable Means-Ends Fit" Standard
The City of Athens analysis requires a defendant government to
produce evidence that its selected ordinance actually serves its
stated objective.20 2 And, the court considered the district court's
finding that the ordinance at issue was the "most practical means"
of serving the governmental interest to be significant. An alterna-
tive "reasonable" standard would define "reasonable" as requiring
a reasonably close fit between the government's means and ends.
Analyzing the relationship between a government's means to its
stated ends is reminiscent of the Town of Huntington court's re-
quirement that a government defendant show that "its actions fur-
thered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide
governmental interest. '20 3 Without more, however, such a stan-
201. See Mahoney, supra note 182, at 434-43 (discussing the important differences
between disparate impact standards for government defendants as compared to pri-
vate defendants). Note that the CHRO court failed to make this distinction: "the
considerations that are to apply once a prima facie case is established would appear to
be the same no matter what the status of the defendant in a fair housing case. Basi-
cally, a court must weigh any adverse impact of a policy against its justification."
CHRO v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 20, 2001).
202. Accord United States v. Town of Cicero, No. 93C-1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *6
(N.D. I11. June 16, 1997). "Cicero's failure to describe any basis for enacting this ordi-
nance and failure to conduct research about the effect that it would have in Cicero
calls its reasonableness into question. Where this and much of the evidence hereto-
fore discussed casts a shadow of doubt upon [the ordinance's] reasonableness, this
issue needs to be resolved by a trier of fact." Id. at *20.
203. NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
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dard should be rejected as insufficient because of its perverse in-
centive: in practice a tighter means-ends fit would almost certainly
cause more discriminatory impact. Allowing governments to adopt
restrictive residential occupancy standards that can be shown to
serve health and safety interests directly and robustly but which
cause significant amounts of discriminatory impact fails to reflect
the Town of Huntington and Village of Arlington analyses' funda-
mental consideration of governmental objectives in relation to
their discriminatory effects. 204 Courts need some further direction
to assess the degree of means-ends fit required with the extent of
discrimination caused. The vital connection between governmental
objectives and discriminatory effect can be provided by incorporat-
ing the City of Athens court's consideration that any discrimination
caused by the policy be "incidental" rather than "substantial." This
additional requirement combines a heightened means-ends fit with
a weak version of the familiar "least restrictive means" test from
the Town of Huntington case. If the discriminatory impact were
"substantial," then even if the means-ends fit was tight, the court
should find that the governmental restriction is not "reasonable."
In summary, in the "reasonable balance" version of the standard,
a court would balance the benefits of local government's health
and safety objectives in regulating overcrowding with the costs in
discrimination to families, ensuring that any discrimination caused
by the regulation is only "incidental" not "substantial." In the
"reasonable means-ends fit" version, a court would scrutinize the
fit between the local government's stated health and safety objec-
tives and the actual consequences of the specific ordinance in
preventing or reducing overcrowding, ensuring that any discrimina-
tion caused by the regulation is only "incidental" not "substantial."
What both versions of the "reasonable" test have in common is
the use of the "incidental" or "substantial" test as a limit on the
discrimination that will be tolerated as "reasonable." Incorporat-
ing the full-bodied "least restrictive means" prong from the Hunt-
ington case would engage the court in a complex search for less
restrictive alternatives 20 5 that serve a government's health and
204. And, such analysis would not serve the FHAA's remedial purpose. It is un-
likely that Congress intended for governments to adopt occupancy standards that pur-
sue health and safety at any discriminatory cost.
205. This analysis is common in discrimination cases and derives from Title VII
employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 1993).
In the fair housing context, see Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149
n.37 (3d Cir. 1977).
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safety objective. Such a requirement would make the "reasonable"
standard indistinguishable from the traditional disparate impact
standard, and thus render the resulting test inapt as the "special
defense." But, adopting the City of Athens inquiry into the extent
of the disparate impact caused as being either "incidental" or "sub-
stantial" identifies a genuinely distinct test for disparate impact.
These two variations on the City of Athens court's approach are
plausible and viable interpretations of the "reasonable" standard
to determine if a governmental restriction qualifies for the
§ 3607(b)(1) defense. In practice, both versions of the "reasona-
ble" standard are less demanding than a standard disparate impact
analysis because they could allow a governmental restriction that
had some "incidental" discriminatory impact to nonetheless qualify
as a "reasonable" restriction under the exemption.
Applying either version of the standard to the facts in the Rich-
mond Heights case would have led the court to remand the case to
the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the
cities could present evidence demonstrating that their chosen occu-
pancy standards actually served their health and safety objectives.
In addition, the court would have had to determine whether or not
the resulting disparate impact on families would be substantial or
merely incidental. Evidence in the record suggests that the impact
might well have been characterized as substantial.2 °6
Both versions of a "reasonable" standard would tend to require
that a city perform research before adopting a residential occu-
pancy ordinance to determine: 1) if an overcrowding problem af-
fects or may soon affect health and safety; 2) whether a residential
occupancy standard is the "most practical means" to address the
particular health and safety concerns in view; and 3) if so, what
occupancy standard would be appropriate to prevent or resolve
such health and safety concerns resulting from actual or expected
overcrowding. Cities enacting ordinances based upon such analysis
could try to secure their qualification for the defense by placing
their analysis, studies, and findings in the legislative record when
they adopt the ordinance.20 7 Such research and consideration
would further the FHAA's goals.
206. See Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights, 998 F. Supp.
825, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("Under the 1991 amendments to the Bedford Heights
ordinance, more than 80% of two bedroom apartments in major complexes would be
limited to three persons.").
207. "Cicero's failure to describe any basis for enacting this [residential occupancy]
ordinance and failure to conduct research about the effect that it would have in Cic-
ero calls its reasonableness into question." Town of Cicero, 1997 WL 337379, at *6.
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If such research were conducted, a primary issue would be
what-or rather whose-health and safety concerns are implicated
by internal density? Arguably, only the health and safety concerns
of tenants of the dwellings to be regulated would be implicated.
Generally, neighbors' concerns about overcrowding-noise, park-
ing, and congestion-are "quality of life" issues that ought to be
considered as coming under the rubric of general welfare rather
than health and safety.2 °8 Similarly, the typical private housing
provider's concerns about overcrowding primarily concern busi-
ness interests rather than health and safety concerns.
20 9
The health and safety concerns of tenants relating to internal
density or "overcrowding," have been identified as having ade-
quate space for exiting the dwelling in an emergency, preventing
communication of disease, and maintaining psychological health.2 1°
Note that in the City of Richmond Heights case the district court found: "Before en-
acting the ordinances, none of the municipalities in this action conducted or reviewed
studies to determine the existence of overcrowding or what would constitute a reason-
able occupancy standard for the respective municipalities." 998 F. Supp. at 827. Evi-
dence in the record did show that the cities consulted local apartment managers to
work out their occupancy standards. Id.
208. It is also possible that excessive trash generated by "overcrowded" tenants
might create a health hazard for neighbors, though this would be easily avoided by the
provision of additional trash cans. Neighbors' quality of life concerns can be ad-
dressed directly by the enforcement of noise ordinances, parking requirements, and
similar regulations which almost every city has on its books.
209. See, e.g., Pfaff v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 749
(9th Cir. 1996) ("preserving the value of one's property"); Snyder v. Barry Realty,
Inc., 953 F.Supp. 217, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("avoid the risk of damage caused by large
numbers of students"); Fair Hous. Council of Orange County, Inc. v. Ayers, 855 F.
Supp. 315, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("prevent damage and destruction to the apartments
from excessive wear and tear"). Courts have held that when a landlord can demon-
strate health and safety issues presented by excessive internal density, these can jus-
tify restrictive residential occupancy standards-for example, if applying less
restrictive occupancy standards would increase occupancy such that water or sewage
systems would be overtaxed. See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 1995) (sewer system capacity);
United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 831 (D. Nev. 1994) (hot water capacity). But
see United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1021 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (defendants
failed to show water and septic problems justified occupancy standard); Human
Rights Comm'n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 659, 666 (Vt. 1995) (defendants failed to
show water and septic problems justified occupancy standard). At least one promi-
nent fair housing advocate agrees that documented health and safety reasons can jus-
tify strict occupancy standards without creating FHAA liability. See Morales, supra
note 21.
210. See, e.g., Kalimian v. Olson, 130 Misc. 2d 861, 862-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)
("maximum occupancy provisions" requiring eighty square feet per person were "in-
tended to prevent practices common earlier in the century, when landlords over-
crowded cramped tenements and rooming house rooms with large numbers of
tenants," which caused "fire and health hazards, unsatisfactory provisions as to sanita-
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Such interests have regularly justified the imposition of residential
occupancy standards by both governments and private housing
providers.211 Governments, however, might find it difficult to col-
lect persuasive evidence linking particular levels of internal density
regulation as actually protecting tenants' health and safety.212
Numerous studies have failed to confirm what seems
obvious.213
tion, [and] insufficient provisions for light and air"); Home Builders League of S.
Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 405 A.2d 381, 390 (N.J. 1979) (referring to Ameri-
can Public Health Association minimum recommended square footage per occupant
as "affect[ing] public health, family stability and emotional well being"); Nolden v. E.
Cleveland City Comm'n, 232 N.E.2d 421, 425-426 (Ohio Common Pleas Ct. 1966)
(purpose of square-footage requirement was to prevent overcrowding that "overtaxes
the use of plumbing," fosters spread of "infectious disease," including respiratory,
digestive, and skin diseases, elevates risks of "home accidents," and may cause
problems in "social development").
211. Sometimes, landlords defend their occupancy restrictions as necessary to en-
sure the "quality of life" of their tenants. See, e.g., Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1252;
Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F.Supp. 304, 314 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (Subjective judgments that a
house is "too small" for a particular size family sufficient to avoid summary
judgment).
212. As yet, there is no basis in the scientific literature for choosing one stan-
dard of unacceptable crowding standard over another. The basic research
issues are so problematic that researchers never get to the standard-setting
stage in applying their findings. Indeed, in a curious twist, they use the un-
proven standard (e.g., > 1.00 [person per room]) to measure the basic phe-
nomena whose extent they are trying to determine. Thus researchers tend to
implicitly leave standard setting to professional organizations such as the
American Public Health Association, or to building code officials ... mean-
while, these organizations pretend the standards have some basis in science.
Myers, Changing Problem, supra note 5, at 68. Most of the identified health and
safety concerns can be addressed by other measures, for example installing more
smoke and C02 alarms to give tenants more time to escape their dwelling in an emer-
gency, while strenghening window and ventilation requirements and trash disposition
requirements address the communication of disease concern. It is more likely that
persuasive scientific evidence can be marshaled to support specific occupancy stan-
dards for elevators, motor vehicles, bathrooms, restaurants, and perhaps even pools
than for housing. All the parties in City of Richmond Heights found experts to testify
concerning the "reasonableness" of the ordinances at issue in that case, but their
opinions were not specifically limited to showing that the specific standards actually
furthered public health and safety. See Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Rich-
mond Heights, 998 F. Supp. 825, 829 (1998) (discussing testimony of plaintiff's and
defendants' experts).
213. Ahrentzen, supra note 6, at 47-56 (casting doubt upon the conclusion that the
net costs/benefits for tenants' health from "doubling up" is known because of poor
study design and because few studies have been done to see what the benefits of
"doubling up" might be to tenants). Note that in states which have adopted the doc-
trine of implied warranty of habitability by statute or by court decsion, tenants al-
ready have a right to deal with physical substandard housing issues which they believe
are harmful to their health and safety. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150 (1984)
(adopting an implied warranty of habitability for residential dwellings).
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This section clarified the meaning of the FHAA exemption by
demonstrating that the "exemption" is best understood as a special
defense for governmental occupancy restrictions and by showing
that "reasonable" must mean non-discriminatory. The section then
offered two plausible versions of a "reasonable" standard derived
from the City of Athen's opinion.
III. THE "SAFE HARBOR" EXTENSION OF THE EXEMPTION
Private housing providers have frequently argued that the
§ 3607(b)(1) exemption should be interpreted as providing a "safe
harbor" for private defendants who provide housing with occu-
pancy standards that are consistent with applicable governmental
standards.214 These defendants contended that the exemption pro-
vided them a complete "safe harbor" defense against familial status
liability.215 The plain language of the exemption-"any reasonable
local, State, or Federal restrictions"-would appear to cover only
governmental occupancy restrictions. 216 While no court has yet ap-
214. It is not clear if the defendant in United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th
Cir. 1992), specifically raised the safe harbor defense. After citing the exemption, the
court states, "The restrictions at issue in this case are not governmentally imposed,
and are far in excess of restrictions imposed by the applicable municipal code." Id. at
1179; see also United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that
defendant's occupancy restriction is more stringent than city's requirements). The
defense is implicitly recognized in United States v. Hover, No. C-93 20061 JW, 1995
WL 55379, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 1995) (finding occupancy standards in violation
of FHAA and enjoining defendants "from enforcing an occupancy standard of less
than two persons per bedroom, except under circumstances where California occu-
pancy standards would be violated based upon the size of the mobile home").
215. In other cases, private housing provider defendants appear to argue that state
and local government occupancy standards preempt the FHAA. See, e.g., United
States v. Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (D. Haw. 1995) (claiming that its occu-
pancy standard is "mandated by City Housing and State Health Codes"). On this
view, if they are in compliance with state or local governmental occupancy standards,
then they cannot be liable for FHAA claims of discrimination related to their imposi-
tion of these standards. This reading of the statute and the exemption is incorrect.
First, Congress clearly intended in the FHAA to limit state and local government
regulation of housing. There is no evidence that Congress intended that state and
local government regulation preempt the FHAA. Second, Congress' inclusion of the
"exemption" for "reasonable" governmental occupancy restrictions demonstrates that
it did not intend that this federal statute completely preempt state and local govern-
mental regulation of internal density. The view that the FHAA is preempted by state
and local government regulation turns Congress' exemption for "reasonable" state
and local governmental occupancy restrictions on its head.
216. See Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir.
1996) (referring to the exemption, "Congress chose to give special deference to gov-
ernment-imposed occupancy limits only. Congress made no comparable provision for
private occupancy policies"). Note that the court stated: "No state or local occupancy
standards control, and the decision has always been [the defendant's] to make." Id. at
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plied the safe harbor defense to release a private housing provider
defendant from liability, some courts appear open to this extension
of the exemption to benefit private housing providers.2 1 7 This sec-
tion considers the justification of an extension of the exemption,
how it ought to be applied by courts, and the resulting importance
for courts' identification of an appropriate standard for "reasona-
ble" occupancy standards under 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
The Preamble to HUD's final regulations on the FHAA makes
clear that during the comment period before issuing the final regu-
lation, HUD was under significant pressure to provide more gui-
dance to private housing providers to enable them to set occupancy
standards that would not violate the FHAA. Immediately follow-
ing its brief mention of the governmental exemption, the Preamble
relates that many commenters on the proposed regulations re-
quested HUD either to develop a non-discriminatory occupancy
742; see also Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. at 1361 ("Notably, § 3607(b)(1) refers to gov-
ernmental restrictions.").
217. See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
("[Djefendants initially rely on the occupancy restrictions found in the Orion Town-
ship building code and [defendant apartment house's] own policies, which defendants
say are permitted under the FHA exemption [citing § 3607(b)(1)]."). The Reeves
court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiff produced
evidence that raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of its
occupancy restriction. Id. at 728. In an unpublished memorandum of decision deny-
ing defendants' motion for summary judgment, a Connecticut court applying federal
and state fair housing law considers numerous claims by defendants that their occu-
pancy standards are nondiscriminatory because they are applying governmental occu-
pancy standards. See CHRO v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374,
at *10-15 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001). In addition, an influential commentator appears to
have accepted this extension of the exemption. See HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW
AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 11E:3 ("The Fair Housing Act specifically allows
housing providers to adhere to 'any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions'
regarding the maximum numbers of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling").
Schwemm cites the statute and Laurenti v. Water's Edge Habitat, Inc., 837 F.Supp.
507, 508-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), as authority. In Laurenti, plaintiffs alleged a violation of
the FHAA and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from evicting
them "so long as the Village of Patchogue takes no action against the defendants to
enforce the Village Occupancy Code." Id. at 508. Defendants claimed, with support-
ing evidence from the Village, that their occupancy standard complied with the Vil-
lage Occupancy Code and that allowing plaintiff's family to occupy an apartment
would violate the Code. Id. at 510. The plaintiffs disputed the defendant's interpreta-
tion of the Village Occupancy Code. Id. The court did not absolve defendant of
liability in that case under a "safe harbor" theory. Rather, it assumed plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and only denied the preliminary injunc-
tion because of misrepresentations by plaintiffs to defendants in their housing applica-
tion and, without offering an interpretation of the Village Occupancy Code, found
that it would be "unlikely that the plaintiffs can show that the defendants' actions
were merely a pretext for discrimination when the defendants reasonably believed
those actions were in accordance with the Village Code." Id. at 511.
OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS
standard upon which they could rely in the absence of a state or
local occupancy code, or to designate that the already existing
HUD occupancy standard for HUD-assisted housing developments
could be relied upon for compliance with the FHAA.218
HUD refused these entreaties for further guidance, 219 explaining
that nothing "in the statute or its legislative history [indicates] any
intent on the part of Congress to provide for the development of a
national occupancy code. ' 220 Instead, HUD explained: "the De-
partment believes that in appropriate circumstances, owners and
managers may develop and implement reasonable occupancy re-
quirements based on factors such as the number and size of sleep-
ing areas or bedrooms and the overall size of the dwelling unit.
221
Adding to private housing providers' frustration and anxiety, HUD
further promised that it would "carefully examine any such non-
governmental restriction to determine whether it operates unrea-
218. Many of these commenters, generally persons involved in the rental of
dwellings and associations representing owners and managers of rental
dwellings, recommended that the final rule include a HUD-developed occu-
pancy standard, and state that in the absence of a State or local occupancy
code, owners or managers complying with the HUD standard would be con-
sidered to be in compliance with the Fair Housing Act with respect to the
treatment of families with children. In the alternative, several commenters
recommended that HUD indicate in the final rule that owners and managers
of rental housing would be in compliance with the Fair Housing Act if they
developed and implemented occupancy standards which are no less stringent
than occupancy guidelines currently used in connection with HUD-assisted
housing programs.
HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23. 1989).
219. Numerous issues about the liability of private housing providers for restrictive
occupancy standards remain unresolved, for example informal internal guidance by
HUD to its investigators appeared to articulate a "reasonable" non-governmental oc-
cupancy standard. A future article will clarify additional issues related to the liability
of private housing providers under the FHAA for restrictive occupancy standards.
There is no consistent standard of liability or analysis applied by the courts to private
housing providers' occupancy policies. The courts have inconsistently answered the
following questions: how to relate governmental standards to private ones?; what
does "reasonable" mean with regard to private housing providers?; how does the
"reasonableness" of a private housing provider's occupancy policy relate to tradi-
tional disparate impact analyses?; does a HUD policy statement establish a de facto
national residential occupancy standard?
220. HUD Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23. 1989). Further, HUD be-
lieved that the occupancy standards it had set for HUD-assisted housing (generally
two person per bedroom) would not be an appropriate basis for guiding private hous-
ing providers because "these guidelines are designed to apply to the types and sizes of
dwellings in HUD programs and they may not be reasonable for dwellings with more
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sonably to limit or exclude families with children. ' 222  HUD
elaborated that the lack of guidance both in the statute and the
regulations were "consistent with Congressional reliance on and
encouragement for States and localities to become active partici-
pants in the effort to promote achievement of the goal of Fair
Housing." 223
There are two plausible justifications for extending the safe har-
bor defense to private housing providers: the statutory language
can be interpreted that way,22 4 and the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
pears to have once acknowledged the safe harbor defense in a foot-
note in dicta.225 But the fact that private housing providers won
several other explicit exemptions from the FHAA for themselves
weighs against reading one into the language here.22 6 And the
222. Id.
223. While the statutory provision providing exemptions to the Fair Housing
Act states that nothing in the law limits the applicability of any reasonable
Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants, there is
no support in the statute or its legislative history which indicates any intent
on the part of Congress to provide for the development of a national occu-
pancy code. This interpretation is consistent with Congressional reliance on
and encouragement for States and localities to become active participants in
the effort to promote achievement of the goal of Fair Housing.
Id.
224. The extension of the exemption can find its justification in the statutory lan-
guage. "Nothing in this subchapter limits the applicability of reasonable [governmen-
tal] restrictions" can be reasonably interpreted to mean that Congress intended to
exempt reasonable governmental restrictions by whomever they were "applied," that
is, whether they were applied by governments or by private parties.
225. "Section 3607(b)(1) makes it plain that, pursuant to local prescriptions on
maximum occupancy, landlords legitimately may refuse to stuff large families into
small quarters." City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 735 n.9 (1995).
226. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (a) (2004) (providing explicit exemption from
FHAA liability if a "religious organization, association, or society" limits housing or
gives housing preference based upon religion, and explicitly exempting a "private
club" from FHAA liability if it limits housing or gives preference for its members to
housing it owns or operates); 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (b)(2) (2004) (exempting "housing for
older persons" as defined in the statute from FHAA liability founded on familial
status). Testimony by housing providers to Congress during its deliberations on the
FHAA suggests that Congress had housing providers and their concerns in view when
it drafted and enacted the legislation. In addition, the "safe harbor" extension of the
exemption would appear to conflict with HUD's "Keating Memorandum" as allowing
"owners and managers [to] develop and implement reasonable occupancy require-
ments based on factors such as the number and size of sleeping areas or bedrooms
and the overall size of the dwelling unit." Memorandum from Frank Keating, HUD
General Counsel, to all Regional Counsel (March 20, 1991) (regarding "Fair Housing
Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Cases") (reprinted at 63 Fed. Reg. 70256-57 (Dec. 28,
1998)). That memorandum makes compliance with state and local law only one of
several factors to be considered in determining whether or not a private housing pro-
vider's occupancy standard would be "reasonable." See id. It does not provide an
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Court stressed that exceptions to the FHAA should be construed
narrowly.227 On balance, the safe harbor defense is probably justifi-
able based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage. It would also provide private housing providers with some
useful guidance on complying with the FHAA with regard to occu-
pancy restrictions.
Nonetheless, courts' application of the safe harbor defense re-
quires consideration. Courts cannot appropriately grant the safe
harbor defense unless the underlying governmental restriction is
shown to be "reasonable" and thus qualifying for the exemption.
Otherwise, courts are giving private housing providers the benefit
of the exemption for "reasonable" governmental occupancy stan-
dards without ever determining if the government standard relied
upon meets the statutory requirement of being "reasonable." If
courts fail to inquire into a governmental standard's reasonable-
ness, any validly-adopted government standards can be used to
avoid FHAA liability. Therefore, in applying the safe harbor de-
fense, court should follow the clearly established rule228 that the
automatic "safe harbor." See id. The legal authority of that memorandum will be
analyzed in a future article.
227. "Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in which an exception to a
'general statement of policy' is sensibly read 'narrowly in order to preserve the pri-
mary operation of the [policy]." City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725,
731-32 (1995); accord Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach 825 F. Supp. 1251
(E.D. Va. 1993). This principle has been followed in construing other exemptions to
the FHAA. For example, "Congress chose to create an exemption for communities
designed to meet the needs of citizens 55 years of age and older. This exemption must
be narrowly construed in order to preserve the balance Congress intended to strike
between housing for older persons and the prohibition against familial status discrimi-
nation." Park Place Home Brokers v. P-K Mobile Home Park, 773 F. Supp. 46, 54
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (reviewing defendant's claim to qualify for the "housing for older
persons" exemption to the FHAA); see also United States v. Columbus Country Club,
915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (denying the "religious organization" exemption to an
organization with only indirect affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church); United
States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975) (denying the
"religious organization" exemption to a private, nonsectarian home for children).
Schwemm notes that while there is no definitive case law interpreting the "private
club" exemption, it appears to include "temporary rooming facilities of social organi-
zations such as university clubs" which are truly private. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 28, § 9:6.
228. See Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626
(6th Cir. 2000) (defendant local governments bear burden of proof to show eligibility
for exemption for "reasonable" occupancy standards); United States v. Lorantffy
Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (stating that party seeking bene-
fit of exemption from FHAA bears burden of proof at all times to demonstrate that
they qualify for it-i.e. "religious organization exemption"); see also Mills Music, Inc.
v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 188 (1985); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir.
1969).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
party seeking an exemption from the FHAA bears the burden of
proving that it qualifies for it.229 Most importantly, courts should
require that private defendants bear the burden of proving that the
governmental standards upon which they rely actually qualify for
the exemption, that they are "reasonable. '230
If accepted by courts, the safe harbor defense could extend the
exemption to any private defendant who applies "reasonable" gov-
ernmental occupancy standards; this defense could affect large
amounts of privately owned housing. The effect of the extension of
the exemption would be to close the gap between government and
private housing provider liability that the FHAA opened up by
granting an exemption directly to governments. Because many
states delegate authority to local governments to set occupancy
standards, 31 local governments can effectively set the baseline for
liability for themselves and private housing providers under the
FHAA. For these reasons, if the safe harbor defense is accepted, it
is very important for courts to adopt a proper interpretation of
"reasonable" for purposes of the exemption.
If courts apply a suitable non-discriminatory test to determine
which governmental standards qualify for the exemption, allowing
private housing providers to get the benefit of the exemption under
the safe harbor defense for such reasonable occupancy restrictions
will not undercut the achievement of the FHAA's remedial goals
and would have the benefit of providing private housing providers
with much needed guidance in how to comply with the FHAA.232
229. Specifically, courts should: 1) determine if the governmental restriction applies
to the defendant's dwelling at issue in the case, meaning that the defendant is re-
quired by law to abide by it; 2) determine if the applicable governmental restriction
meets both the eligibility requirements of Edmonds and the qualifying "reasonable"
test set forth in Part II.D; and, 3) determine if the defendant's occupancy policy is the
same as or less restrictive than the applicable and reasonable governmental
restriction.
230. It makes no sense to require plaintiffs to bear this burden. And, if the private
housing provider defendant does not bear this burden, then anytime a defendant
claimed the safe harbor defense plaintiffs would be required to sue the local jurisdic-
tion to defend the occupancy restriction upon which the private housing provider de-
fendant is relying. See CHRO v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL
951374, at *10-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2001) (when defendant sought the "safe
harbor" defense, the court noted that state occupancy provisions apply to the defen-
dant, and then properly stated that "although local ordinances restricting the maxi-
mum number of occupants may be exempt from the operation of the fair housing acts,
for such exemption to apply they must be 'reasonable."').
231. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 311.
232. Since governmental occupancy standards would be reviewed for how they ac-




One important way that governments and private housing prov-
iders distribute housing opportunities is by setting and enforcing
residential occupancy standards to prevent overcrowding. Tradi-
tional regulation of "overcrowding" conflicts with widespread and
long-standing practices of families and extended families living
closely together in a way that may be beneficial to them and to
society. Overly restrictive residential occupancy standards im-
posed by both governments and private housing providers unduly
burden families, and especially families of color in the context of a
chronic and likely worsening housing crisis across the nation.
The FHAA should offer help. An overbroad exemption that al-
lows both government and private housing provider defendants to
escape liability under FHAA for potentially discriminatory resi-
dential occupancy standards would weaken that promise of assis-
tance. The Sixth Circuit's deferential standard of "reasonable" in
City of Richmond Heights, and courts' acceptance of the "safe har-
bor" defense, open the door for governments and private housing
providers to unduly restrict living closely practices by exempting
restrictive residential occupancy policies from challenge under the
FHAA. If courts fail to give the "reasonable" standard any teeth,
then this type of housing discrimination will not be challenged be-
cause restrictive government standards judged to be exempt from
FHAA under a deferential standard can then give legal "cover" to
restrictive private housing provider standards.
Closing this loophole requires confronting the puzzle that Con-
gress created by creating an "exemption" based upon a "reasona-
ble" standard that is also non-discriminatory. The best
interpretation of the "exemption" is that Congress intended to es-
tablish a different standard of liability for governmental entities
rather than to create a typical "exemption" that is raised as an af-
firmative defense. The "exemption" is more accurately called a
special defense.
This article has offered two versions of a "reasonable" standard
based upon the Eleventh Circuit's City of Athens opinion. In the
"reasonable balance" version of the standard, a court would bal-
ance the benefits of local government's health and safety objectives
in regulating overcrowding with the costs in discrimination to fami-
lies, ensuring that any discrimination caused by the regulation is
occupancy standards that private housing providers might otherwise adopt to serve
their business interests.
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only "incidental" not "substantial." In the "reasonable means-ends
fit" version, a court would scrutinize the fit between the local gov-
ernment's stated health and safety objectives and the actual conse-
quences of the specific ordinance in preventing or reducing
overcrowding, ensuring that any discrimination caused by the regu-
lation is only "incidental" not "substantial."
Since a party seeking to take advantage of an exemption bears
the burden of proving its qualification for it, private housing prov-
iders seeking to rely on governmental standards to escape FHAA
liability under the "safe harbor" defense bear the burden of prov-
ing that they are reasonable under the appropriate standard. The
consequence of this approach is that governments as well as private
housing providers who seek "safe harbor" under governmental
standards will be required to demonstrate that their residential oc-
cupancy standards are "reasonable," meaning not discriminatory.
When its legal analysis and standards are clarified, FHAA's pro-
visions prohibiting discrimination against familial status via restric-
tive residential occupancy standards can be reconciled with the
enigmatic "exemption" for "reasonable" governmental occupancy
restrictions, and the FHAA can be a powerful tool to ensure equity
in the distribution of housing opportunities for families in cities
and suburbs.
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